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THE INVERSE PROBLEM FOR POWER DISTRIBUTIONS IN COMMITTEES
SASCHA KURZ
ABSTRACT. Several power indices have been introduced in the literature in order to measure the influ-
ence of individual committee members on the aggregated decision. Here we ask the inverse question
and aim to design voting rules for a committee such that a given desired power distribution is met as
closely as possible. We present an exact algorithm for a large class of different power indices based on
integer linear programming. With respect to negative approximation results we generalize the approach
of Alon and Edelman who studied power distributions for the Banzhaf index, where most of the power
is concentrated on few coordinates. It turned out that each Banzhaf vector of an n-member committee
that is near to such a desired power distribution, has to be also near to the Banzhaf vector of a k-member
committee. We show that such Alon-Edelman type results are possible for other power indices like e.g.
the Public Good index or the Coleman index to prevent actions, while they are principally impossible
for e.g. the Johnston index.
Keywords: simple games, weighted majority games, power indices
MSC: 91B12, 94C10
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a committee that attains its decisions by voting like e.g. the U.S. Senate or the European
Parliament. Whenever the committee members have different capabilities to influence decisions, the
question for the measurement of individual power arises. Dating back to the late 18th century, Luther
Martin was probably the first approaching this issue, see e.g. [30]. Since the second half of the 20th
century, several power indices were formally introduced in order to measure the voting power in
collective decision making procedures, see e.g. [6, 9, 29, 51, 52] for some surveys and discussions. A
huge amount of literature has been devoted to the study of the properties, shortcomings, paradoxes,
and axiomatic foundations of several power indices. Within the scientific community the general
approval of a unique power index as the optimal compromise is not yet in sight1. So some researches
argue to choose the appropriate index according to the situation2, see e.g. [76].
Having a suitable power index at hand, one can ask the fundamental problem of how to design a
voting procedure, such that the resulting distribution of power (according to the chosen power index)
among the committee members meets or almost meets a fixed vector3. This is commonly called the
inverse power index problem4. As an algorithmic answer, several heuristics, mostly with an itera-
tive nature, and exact algorithms have been developed, see [48] for a recent overview. The proposed
heuristics are generally quite fast and produce good numerical results, meaning that they achieve
small approximation errors on practical instances. From the theoretical point of view there is a fun-
damental problem, since those algorithms are not able to give a priori bounds what approximation
errors are achievable. Also non-trivial a posteriori bounds are missing. Thus one simply does not
know whether an iterative heuristic has converged sufficiently, i.e. its approximation error is near the
minimum possible approximation. Methods based on exhaustive enumeration of voting procedures,
see e.g. [19, 20, 45], can in principle determine the exact solution of the inverse problem in finite
time. Since for most classes of voting procedures their number grows faster than exponential, those
exhaustive algorithms are applicable for small numbers of voters only. Unfortunately, no intermedi-
ate lower bounds are produced so that one either has to completely determine the exact solution or
1Arguably, some power indices, like the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index, are generally more accepted and applied
than others. On the other hand, the pros and cons of several power indices are frequently discussed in the older and latest
literature.
2As an example, we mention [10] arguing that the Johnston index is best suited for measuring presidential power.
3There exists a stream of literature discussing the question of a fair power distribution within a committee, see e.g.
[54, 69, 53, 75].
4There are several more recent papers using this denomination and trying to algorithmically attack this issue. Consider-
ations about the problem itself date back for a longer time, see. e.g. [41, 66, 68].
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to be contented with the best solution found in a limited time horizon, i.e. using the approach as an
elaborate heuristic. Approaches based on integer linear programming, see [46], automatically come
with lower and upper bounds in the intermediate computation steps. The drawback is the lack of
theoretical bounds on the running time and the approximation quality, when interrupted after a poly-
nomial running time. Recently, several algorithms have been designed that can achieve a sufficiently
accurate approximation with running time polynomial in terms of the number of players times a factor
depending on the desired approximation quality, see [17, 67, 18].5
Since the number of voting procedures is generally finite as the number of voters is fixed, one
clearly cannot approximate certain power distributions too closely if the number of voters is small.
As mentioned before, the number of voting procedures grows faster than exponential for the most
relevant classes, so that one might expect that for large committees each desired power distribution
can be approximated to a nicety. Indeed there exists a stream of literature concerning with limit
results saying that under certain technical conditions one can simply choose the entries of a given
power distribution as weights in a weighted voting game, whose power distribution then is relatively
close to the initial vector, see e.g. [13, 26, 49, 56, 57, 59, 64, 73].
It was quite a surprise when Alon and Edelman showed that many power distributions, where most
of the power is concentrated on a small number of players, are hard to approximate independently
of the number of players. In their seminal paper [1], the authors give explicit bounds stating that a
Banzhaf vector, whose weight is concentrated on k < n players, has to be near to the Banzhaf vector
of a game with n − k null players, which is essentially a game with just k players. In [46], their
theorem was applied to deduce that for n ≥ 2 players the ‖ · ‖1-distance between the Banzhaf vector
of a simple game and the power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) has to be at least 19 . Computationally
a lower approximation bound of at least 0.37846 was shown for all simple games up to 11 players.
The contribution of this paper consists of a slight tightening of the Alon-Edelman bound. As a
consequence, we can deduce that for n ≥ 2 players the ‖ · ‖1-distance between the Banzhaf vector
of a simple game and (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) has to be at least 18 . We slightly generalize their theorem so
that it is applicable for some classes of voting procedures other than simple games. More importantly,
we continue their study of inverse power index problems and prove similar bounds for several power
indices defined in the literature. As argued before, this is relevant for the practical application of
power indices, since different power indices are suitable in different settings and the Banzhaf index
is just a single, while rather important, example of a power index. To this end we break down the
approach of Alon and Edelman into smaller pieces, which can be studied from a more general point of
view. Several parts of this new theoretic framework can then be used for different power indices and
the considerations depending on the precise definition, of the power index under study, are somewhat
minimized. It will turn out that many power indices, including e.g. the Public Good index, the Shift
index, and the Deegan-Packel index, admit an Alon-Edelman type approximation bound, while the
Johnston index does not admit such a result. For other concepts of power indices, like p-binomial
semivalues, the rounding procedure proposed in [1] does not work directly, but may be adjusted in
a meaningful way. So there are classes of power indices that admit Alon-Edelman type results and
others that do not. With respect to the classification of power indices and their comparison, this
structural distinction might be interesting in itself and deserves further study. While we can decide to
which class certain power indices belong for many cases, we leave a few examples, like the Shapley-
Shubik index, open and just state conjectures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce the classes of
binary voting procedures along with some notational conventions. The power indices we are studying
in this paper are defined in Section 3. The main general framework for Alon-Edelman type results is
stated in Section 4. An integer linear programming formulation for the inverse power index problem
for power indices based on counting functions is stated in Section 5. The counterpart of desired power
distributions, where most of the power is concentrated on a small number of coordinates, is studied
in Section 6. It turns out that with the aid of so-called limit results the (approximate) inverse power
index problem becomes almost trivial under certain technical conditions. We end the main part of
the paper with a conclusion and some remarks on possible future work in Section 7. The technical
5For completeness, we remark that there is also a stream of literature that characterizes the sets of transferable utility
games, i.e. more general objects than the voting procedures that we will study here, whose distribution vector of a certain
value, i.e. a more general object than a power index, exactly coincides with a given vector, see e.g. [22, 23, 24].
THE INVERSE PROBLEM FOR POWER DISTRIBUTIONS IN COMMITTEES 3
proofs for our Alon-Edelman type results from Section 4 are shifted to Appendix A. The technical
details for the parametric class of weighted voting games, e.g. used to prove the non-existence of an
Alon-Edelman type result for the Johnston index, are presented in Appendix B.
2. BINARY VOTING PROCEDURES
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the study of binary voting procedures. By this we mean that
each committee member has the possibility to vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for each proposal. The ag-
gregated committee decision then also has to be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This assumption is certainly
an oversimplification in several practical applications and more general models with several levels of
approvals in the input and output have been stated in the literature, see e.g. [8, 34, 35]. Also contin-
uous models or the presence of communication, interaction structures, or a priori unions have been
studied so far. We will abstain from all those refinements and leave the study of the corresponding
Alon-Edelman type bounds as significant open research problems. Next we will give a brief intro-
duction in the taxonomy of binary voting procedures and refer the interested reader to e.g. [77] for a
more detailed treatment.
Within this paper we denote by N the set of committee members, voters, or players. For brevity,
we will only use the term players in the following, which is commonly used in the literature. Its
cardinality |N | is denoted by n. Since in our context the names of the players play no role, we will
typically use the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} =: [n]. Similarly let (k, n] := {k + 1, . . . , n}, for positive
integers k < n, and 2X denote the set of all subsets of a (finite) set X . Subsets of N , i.e. elements
of 2N , are also called coalitions. To keep notation as simple as possible we will frequently use the
following set-theoretic abbreviations: N − S = N\S, S − i = S\{i}, S + i = S ∪ i = S ∪ {i},
where S,N are sets and i ∈ S.
Definition 2.1. A Boolean game is a function v : 2N → {0, 1} with v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1. The set
of all Boolean games on n players, i.e. one can assume N = [n], is denoted by Bn.
The restriction v(∅) = 0 is some kind of a minimal reasonable assumption in the context of voting
in a committee. In a situation where no player is in favor of a proposal it would be pretty factitious if
the aggregated overall committee decision would be ‘yes’. A similar consideration can be performed
for the situation where all committee members are in favor of a proposal. More such reasonability
arguments come to one’s mind immediately, e.g. an enlarged group of supporters should not turn the
aggregated decision from ‘yes’ to ‘no’:
Definition 2.2. A simple game is a Boolean game v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all
∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . The set of all simple games on n players is denoted by Sn.
The coalitions S ⊆ N of a Boolean game v with v(S) = 1 are called winning coalitions and the
other ones are called loosing coalitions. If S is a winning coalition, but all of its proper subsets are
losing, we call S a minimal winning coalition. Similarly we call a losing coalition S maximal losing
if all of its proper supersets are winning.
Definition 2.3. Let v be a Boolean game. By W we denote the set of all winning and by Wm we
denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions of v. Similarly, by L we denote the set of all losing
and by LM we denote the set of all maximal losing coalitions of v.
We remark that each simple game is uniquely characterized by specifying N and either one of the
setsW , Wm, L, or LM . So in the following we will from time to time also use the pair (W, N) to
denote a simple game instead of the function notation v : 2N → {0, 1}. A player that is not contained
in any minimal winning coalition is called a null player. Boolean games are uniquely characterized
by either of the setsW or L.
Logically inverting the statement of a proposal can result in counterintuitive outcomes in the con-
text of voting, if all simple games are permitted. So far it is possible that both, a coalition S and its
complementary coalition N\S, can carry through a proposal.
Definition 2.4. A simple game is called proper if the complement N − S of any winning coalition S
is losing. It is called strong if the complement N − S of any losing coalition S is winning. A simple
game that is both proper and strong is called constant-sum (or self-dual, or decisive).
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The desirability relation, introduced in [42], assumes a certain intuitive ordering of the players:
Definition 2.5. Given a simple game (W, N) we say that player i ∈ N is more desirable as player j ∈
N , denoted by i  j, if
(1) for all S ⊆ N − {i, j} with S + j ∈ W , we have S + i ∈ W;
(2) for all S ⊆ N − {i, j} with S + i ∈ L, we have S + j ∈ L = 2N −W .
We write i ' j if i  j, j  i and use i  j as abbreviation for i  j, i 6' j.
Definition 2.6. A simple game (W, N) is called complete if for each pair of players i, j ∈ N we
have i  j or j  i. The set of all complete (simple) games on n players is denoted by Cn.
Definition 2.7. Let (W, [n]) be a complete simple game, where 1  2  · · ·  n, and S ⊆ N .
A coalition T ⊆ N is a direct left-shift of S whenever there exists a player i ∈ S with i − 1 /∈ S
such that T = S − {i} + {i − 1} for i > 1 or T = S + {n} for n /∈ S. Similarly, a coalition
T ⊆ N is a direct right-shift of S whenever there exists a player i ∈ S with i + 1 /∈ S such that
T = S − {i} + {i + 1} for i < n or T = S − {n} for n ∈ S. A coalition T is a left-shift of S
if it arises as a sequence of direct left-shifts. For brevity we denote this case by T  S. Similarly,
it is a right-shift of S if it arises as a sequence of direct right-shifts. For brevity we denote this case
by T  S. A winning coalition S such that all right-shifts of S are losing is called shift-minimal
(winning). Similarly, a losing coalition S such that all left-shifts of S are winning is called shift-
maximal (losing). ByWsm we denote the set of all shift-minimal winning coalitions of (W, N) and
by LsM the set of all shift-maximal losing coalitions.
We remark that every shift-minimal winning coalition has to be a minimal winning coalition and
each shift-maximal losing coalition has to be a maximal losing coalition.
Definition 2.8. A simple game (W, [n]) is weighted if there exists a quota q > 0 and weights
w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0 such that S is winning if and only if w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. We denote the game by
[q;w1, . . . , wn]. The set of all weighted (simple) games on n players is denoted by Tn.
Since the weights clearly induce the desirability relation, each weighted game is complete. We
remark that weighted representations are not unique, e.g. [2; 2, 1, 1] = [3; 3, 2, 1]. Not every simple
game is weighted, but it can be represented as a finite intersection of weighted games.
The number of Boolean games on n players, not taking symmetry into account, is clearly given
by 22
n−1. Enumeration results for the other subclasses of binary voting procedures can be found in
[20, 45, 50].
3. POWER INDICES
Power indices are a formal way to measure the influence of a single player on the outcome of
a committee decision. They became necessary when researchers relatively early have discovered
that the relative influences are not directly proportional to voting weights in a weighted game, see
e.g. [48] for a more extensive discussion. In most cases, power indices can be defined for larger
classes than weighted games, sometimes even for transferable utility games. Many power indices
have been proposed so far in the literature. Here, we want to briefly present a large collection of
those and arrange them in a somewhat systematic order. Our classification and listing is based on
[3, 6, 9, 29, 30, 38, 51, 52, 65]6. In general terms, a power index on a class Vn ⊆ Bn of binary games,
consisting of n players, is a mapping g : Vn → Rn. Mostly we use Vn ∈ {Bn,Sn} and in some cases
the restriction to Vn ∈ {Cn, Tn}. Usually we state the definition of the vector-valued power indices
just for its components gi, i.e. for an arbitrary player i ∈ N .
3.1. Power indices derived from values. Some power indices are derived from values or solution
concepts for transferable utility games, see e.g. [4, 12] for the more general point of view. Here we
will state only the restriction of the underlying values to power indices, i.e. to simple or Boolean
games instead of transferable utility games. Let us start with one of the most famous values or power
indices: In [74], the Shapley value was axiomatically introduced and shortly after, see [75], restricted
to simple games:
6Also the website http://powerslave.val.utu.fi/indices.html has served as a source.
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Definition 3.1. The Shapley-Shubik index of a Boolean game v : 2N → {0, 1} for voter i ∈ N is
given by
SSIi(v) =
∑
S⊆N−i
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!
|N |! · (v(S ∪ i)− v(S)) .
The Shapley-Shubik index satisfies some nice properties, i.e. it is symmetric, positive, efficient on
Sn and satisfies the null player property.
Definition 3.2. Let g : Vn → Rn = (gi)i∈[n] be a power index on a class Vn of binary games. We
say that
(1) g is symmetric: if for all v ∈ Vn and any bijection τ : [n]→ [n] we have gτ(i)(τv) = gi(v),
where τv(S) = v(τ(S)) for any coalition S ⊆ [n];
(2) g is positive: if for all v ∈ Vn and all i ∈ [n] we have gi(v) ≥ 0 and g(v) 6= 0;
(3) g is efficient: if for all v ∈ Vn we have
∑n
i=1 gi(v) = 1;
(4) g satisfies the null player property: if for all v ∈ Vn and all null players i of v we have
gi(v) = 0.
We remark that the Shapley-Shubik index is not efficient on Bn in general (for n ≥ 3) by looking at
the following example: Define the Boolean game v : 2[3] → {0, 1}, which attains the value 1 exactly
for the coalitions {1}, {2}, and {1, 2, 3}. Inserting into the definition gives SSI1(v) = SSI2(v) = 12 ,
and SSI3(v) = 13 , which sums up to
4
3 6= 1. Nevertheless, Boolean games might be seen as a rather
obscure class of binary voting procedures, we remark that many of the subsequent power indices
are not efficient. Since efficiency is a desirable property (in some contexts), we generally define a
normalization of a power index in order to make it efficient:
Definition 3.3. For a positive power index P : Vn → Rn we define the corresponding normalized
power index P̂ : Vn → Rn as P̂i(v) = Pi(v)∑n
j=1 Pj(v)
for all v ∈ Vn.
Lemma 3.4. With the notation and assumptions from Definition 3.3, P̂ is efficient (on Vn).
If we call each player i ∈ N a vetoer of a simple game v whenever v(N − i) = 0, then we can
restate the index from [78]:
Definition 3.5. The Tijs index of a simple game v : 2N → {0, 1}, containing at least one vetoer, for
player i ∈ N is given by Tijsi(v) = 1 is i is a vetoer and zero otherwise.
The Tijs index is symmetric and satisfies the null player property. If the class of games is restricted
to those containing at least one vetoer, the Tijs index is also positive, so that its normalized version
is efficient due to Lemma 3.4. For our purposes the possibility Tijs(v) = 0 causes minor technical
difficulties. Nevertheless vetoers are an important concept in political science. In [79] analyses of
existing political institutions have been formalized into the so-called veto-player-theorem, e.g. stating
that departure from the status quo in political institutions is more likely, the smaller is the number of
vetoers (which makes also sense if no vetoer is present).
In [72], the author has introduced the nucleolus Nuc as the lexicographically minimal imputation.
It has been proposed as a power index as recently as the last decade, see e.g. [54, 60, 61]. We remark
that the nucleolus satisfies all four properties of Definition 3.2 (on Boolean games).
Semivalues were introduced in [80] for simple games and later generalized in [25]. They can be
seen as weighted averages of a player’s marginal contribution to coalitions.
Definition 3.6. Letp = (p0, . . . , pn−1) be a vector of non-negative real numbers satisfying
∑n−1
j=0 pj
(
n−1
j
)
=
1. The semivalue of a Boolean game v : 2N → {0, 1} with respect to p for player i ∈ N is given by
Ψpi (v) =
∑
S⊆N−i
p|S| · [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] .
The Shapley-Shubik index is given by pj = 1n·(n−1j )
and the later on defined absolute Banzhaf
index is given by pj = 12 for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Semivalues are symmetric, positive and satisfy the
null player property on Sn, but typically are not efficient.
Definition 3.7. For p ∈ (0, 1) the semivalue Ψp = Ψp, with pj = pj(1−p)n−1−j for 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1,
is called a p-binomial semivalue.
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3.2. Power indices bases on winning, swing, and critical coalitions. In [6] the authors present a
large list of autonomously generated power indices, as they call them, which are, in contrast to those
from the previous section, not obtained from values. We repeat and enlarge their list at this place
and the following subsection. All examples are based on winning, critical, minimal winning, shift-
minimal winning, and swing coalitions and in some sense more or less related to the Banzhaf index.
A possibly more general point of view is taken in Subsection 3.5.
In order to state the definitions of the announced power indices we need a bit more notation:
Definition 3.8. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game. A coalition S ⊆ N − i with v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = 1
is called an i-swing or a swing for player i. The number of i-swings of player i ∈ N is denoted by
ηi. As abbreviation we use η =
∑n
j=1 ηj .
LetWi denote the set of winning coalitions that contain player i. For an i-swing S ⊆ N − i the
coalition S ∪ i is a winning coalition. We say that i is critical in S ∪ i since removing player i from
S ∪ i turns the coalition from winning to losing. For a losing coalition S ⊆ N − i, we similarly say
that player i is critical if S ∪ i is winning.
Definition 3.9. The absolute Banzhaf index7 of a simple game v = (W, [n]) for player i ∈ N is given
by BZi(v) = ηi(v)/2n−1.
Its normalization B̂Z is usually called the relative Banzhaf index and satisfies all four properties of
Definition 3.2.
In [15] the author, among other things, defined two power indices:
Definition 3.10. Let v : 2N → {0, 1} be a simple game. The Coleman power of a member to prevent
action for player i ∈ N is given by
ColPrevi(v) =
# winning coalitions in which i is critical
total number of winning coalitions
=
ηi(v)
|W|
and the Coleman power of a member to initiate action is given by
ColInii(v) =
# losing coalitions in which i is critical
total number of losing coalitions
.
As noted e.g. in [26], the normalized versions of the power indices from Definition 3.9 and Defini-
tion 3.10 coincide, i.e. we have B̂Z = ĈolPrev = ĈolIni. In other words those three power indices
are scaled versions of each other. We remark that for different purposes normalizing power indices
indeed destroys some information since the scaling variant depends non-trivially on the game. So in
practice all three power indices may have their justification.
Definition 3.11. The Rae index8 of a Boolean game v = 2N → {0, 1} for player i ∈ N is given by
Raei(v) =
|S ⊆ N : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1|+ |S ⊆ N : i /∈ S, v(S) = 0|
2|N |
.
In [26, Eq. 53, p. 124], the authors prove the identity
Rae(v) =
1
2
+
1
2
· Bz(v),
which was also known to Penrose long before the publication of Rae, see e.g. [30]. In other words, the
Rae index arises as a linear transformation from the absolute Banzhaf index. In our context we can
easily conclude Alon-Edelman type bounds for linearly transformed power indices, see Lemma 4.12
and Lemma 4.18.
Definition 3.12. The Ko¨nig-Bra¨uninger index9 of a Boolean game v = 2N → {0, 1} for player i ∈ N
is given by
KBi(v) =
# winning coalitions that contain i
total number of winning coalitions
=
|Wi|
|W| .
7Named after [5], but originally going back to [69], so that some authors speak of the Penrose-Banzhaf index.
8Originally, the Rae index was introduced in [70]. It coincides with the satisfaction index studied in a different context
in [11] and is sometimes called the Brams-Lake index.
9Introduced in [44] and also called inclusiveness index. This index is equivalent to the Zipke index, see [63].
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A rather similar power index has been defined in [7]:
Definition 3.13. The Public Help index of a Boolean game v = 2N → {0, 1} for player i ∈ N is
given by
PHIi(v) =
|Wi|∑
j∈N |Wj |
.
The last two power indices are closely related to the so-called Chow parameters introduced in [14].
In their original form, they are given by the n + 1 numbers |W1|, . . . , |Wn| and |W|.10 We remark
that the (original) Chow parameters uniquely characterize each simple game. Dropping the number of
winning coalitions gives a vector of n numbers, which uniquely characterizes each weighted game,
and can be used as a power index. We have K̂B = P̂HI = Ĉhow and remark that the vector
(η1, . . . , ηn) of the number of swings is called Banzhaf score by some authors.
Definition 3.14. The Chow index of a Boolean game v = 2N → {0, 1} for player i ∈ N is given by
Chowi(v) = |Wi|.
The power indices described so far in this subsection, are all linear transforms of counting winning,
losing, swing, or critical coalitions. Here, an object like a winning coalition for the Chow index can
be counted for multiple players, i.e. it is counted for all members of the respective coalition. Another
concept is to distribute the contribution, of a winning coalition S in our example, equally among
the contributing players, i.e. to just count 1|S| instead of 1 for all members of S. In Subsection 3.5,
or more precisely in Definition 3.22, we describe the underlying idea in more detail. Applying this
rather general concept to the absolute Banzhaf index after multiplication with 2n−1 gives:
Definition 3.15. The absolute Johnston index11 of a Boolean game v = 2N → {0, 1} for voter i ∈ N
is given by
JSi(v) =
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N : i is critical in S, v(i)=1
1
# of critical players in S
.
For the weighted game [2; 2, 1, 1] with player set [3], the absolute Johnston index is given by(
3, 12 ,
1
2
)
. Its normalization ĴS, called relative Johnston index, is given by
(
3
4 ,
1
8 ,
1
8
)
. For the weighted
voting game [3; 2, 1, 1] with player set [3] we have JS =
(
2, 12 ,
1
2
)
and ĴS =
(
2
3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
, which coin-
cides with the Shapley-Shubik vector.
3.3. Power indices derived from minimal or shift-minimal winning coalitions. In the previous
subsection we have considered power indices based on winning, critical, or swing coalitions. The
underlying idea is that the distinction between a winning and a losing coalition is the crucial difference
which should be mirrored in the definition of a power index. On the other hand, Riker introduced
so the so-called Riker’s size principle in [71], claiming that parties attempt to increase the size of
a coalition supporting a proposal only until the point where it gets minimally winning. Thus, we
consider power indices based on minimal or shift-minimal winning coalitions in this subsection and
remark that there are also other lines of argumentation in order to justify those concepts, see e.g.
[40, 39, 81]. As abbreviation we useWmi for the set of minimal winning coalitions containing player i
andWsmi for the set of shift-minimal winning coalitions containing player i.
Definition 3.16. The absolute Public Good index12 of a simple game v = 2N → {0, 1} = (W, N)
for voter i ∈ N is given by
PGIi(v) = |Wmi | .
Its normalization P̂GI is called (relative) Public Good index.
As the Johnston index arises from the Banzhaf index by a certain payoff-distribution rule, see
Definition 3.22, there is also a counterpart to the Public Good index:
10Some authors have redefined them as η1, . . . , ηn, i.e. the number of i-swings being the numerators of the absolute
Banzhaf index, and |W|. The relation between both versions is given by ηi = 2|Wi| − |W|, see e.g. [26].
11Introduced in [43] and also called Johnston score by some authors.
12The (relative) Public Good index was introduced in [38] and is also known as the Holler-Packel index due to an
axiomatization of Holler and Packel.
8 SASCHA KURZ
Definition 3.17. The absolute Deegan-Packel index13 of a simple game v = 2N → {0, 1} = (W, N)
for player i ∈ N is given by
DPi(v) =
∑
S∈Wmi
1
|S| .
Its normalization D̂P = 1|Wm| ·DP is called (relative) Deegan-Packel index.
For shift-minimal winning coalitions we have a similar pair of power indices:
Definition 3.18. The absolute Shift index14 of a complete simple game v = 2N → {0, 1} = (W, N)
for player i ∈ N is given by
Shifti(v) = |Wsmi | .
Its normalization Ŝhift is called (relative) Shift index.
Definition 3.19. The absolute Shift-Deegan-Packel index15 of a complete simple game v = 2N →
{0, 1} = (W, N) for player i ∈ N is given by
SDPi(v) =
∑
S∈Wsmi
1
|S| .
Its normalization ŜDP = 1|Wsm| · SDP is called (relative) Shift-Deegan-Packel index.
3.4. Power indices for weighted games. Most of the power indices introduced so far were defined
for simple games or even Boolean games. The Shift index and the Shift-Deegan-Packel index from
the previous subsection are an exception that can only be defined for complete simple games. For the
most restrictive class of binary voting procedures that we are considering in this paper, i.e. weighted
games, also a very few power indices have been introduced in the literature.
In [16] the authors defined a different variant of the Banzhaf index by reweighting a swing based
counting. For a given weighted voting game v : 2[n] → {0, 1} = [q;w1, . . . , wn] the Colomer index,
which is also known under the name executive power index, is defined as
Colomeri(v) =
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
wi·
(
v(S)−v(S−i)
)
∑
j∈S wj ·
(
v(S)−v(S−j)
)∑
S⊆N f(S)
=
∑
S∈Wi
wi·
(
v(S)−v(S−i)
)
∑
j∈S wj ·
(
v(S)−v(S−j)
)
|W| .
We remark that this index directly depends on the weighted representation of the game and not only
the underlying simple game, i.e. the function v does not suffices to determine the values of the power
distribution, so that our notation Colomeri(v) is slightly misleading.
An index that is not harmed by the ambiguity of weighted representations is defined in [31]. The
underlying theoretical concepts are minimum sum integer representations of weighted games, see e.g.
[45, 33]. While such representations do not need to be unique in general, at the very least the set of
such distinguished representations is finite in all cases. The so-called MSR index is defined as the
average over all minimum sum integer representations of weighted game. In some sense this index
brings us back to the original motivation for power indices, i.e. to have a measure for influence better
than the original weights, which can vary to a large extend of what is generally considered as being
meaningful.
3.5. Counting functions. Many of the power indices defined in the previous subsections have a
common structure, i.e. they arise by counting a certain quantity like swing coalitions or winning
coalitions16. In some cases these counts are weighted like for the p-binomial semivalues. Almost
always those counts can be decomposed as a sum over all coalitions.
13The (relative) Deegan-Packel index was introduced in [21].
14The (relative) Shift index was introduced in [2]. As a justification for power indices based on shift-minimal winning
coalitions one may go along Riker’s size principle and additionally assume that parties try to avoid the inclusion of powerful
members.
15The (relative) Shift-Deegan-Packel index was introduced in [3].
16Several authors have tried to provide a description of such a common structure, see e.g. [6, 58]. Our approach does
not claim to be superior and has of course many similarities, but it seems to be more convenient in our situation.
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Definition 3.20. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players. A counting function C (on Vn) is a
mapping from Vn × 2N × N to Rn≥0. We write Ci : Vn × 2N → R≥0 for the restriction of C to an
arbitrary player i ∈ N and C : Vn × 2N → R≥0 with C(v, S) =
∑
j∈N Ci(v, S).
An example of a counting function, on the set Sn of simple games consisting of n players, is given
by
Ci(v, S) =
{
1/2n−1 : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise.
We remark that it counts the number ηi of i-swings via ηi(v) = 2n−1 ·
∑
S⊆N Ci(v, S). A different
counting function that counts the same quantities is given by
C˜i(v, S) =
{
1/2n−1 : i /∈ S, v(S) = 0, v(S + i) = 1,
0 : otherwise.
Definition 3.21. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players. Given a counting function C on Vn,
the induced power index P : Vn → Rn≥0 (on Vn) is given by
Pi(v) = Ci(v, 2
N ) :=
∑
S∈2N
Ci(v, S)
for all i ∈ [n] and all v ∈ Vn. By Pˆ we denote the normalized version of P , see Definition 3.3.
The induced power indices of bothC and C˜, as stated above, are equivalent to the absolute Banzhaf
index. In the following we will write CBz when referring to this counting function C. When summed
up over all coalitions CBzi counts the number of coalitions where i is a critical player. Similarly∑n
i=1
∑
S⊆N C
Bz
i (·, S) gives the number of coalitions with at least a critical player, including multi-
plicities.
We remark that it is not too hard to give counting functions for all power indices of Section 3,
except for the nucleolus, the Colomer index and the MSR index, such that the corresponding induced
power index is equivalent to the respective power index. Two such examples are given by
CPGIi (v, S) =
{
1 : S ∈ Wmi ,
0 : otherwise
for the absolute Public Good index and
CShifti (v, S) =
{
1 : S ∈ Wsmi ,
0 : otherwise
for the absolute Shift index. The first function counts minimal winning coalitions and the second
counts shift-minimal winning coalitions.
Of course it is easily possible to write down a counting function such that the induced power index
is equivalent to the absolute Johnston index:
CJSi (v, S) =
{ 1
|{j∈S : v(S−j)=0}| : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise.
But as we mentioned in Subsection 3.2 a more general concept is underlying:
Definition 3.22. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players and C be a counting function on Vn.
The equal division counting function C ′ is given by
C ′i(v, S) =
{
maxj∈S Cj(v,S)
|{j∈S :Cj(v,S)>0}| : Ci(v, S) > 0,
0 : otherwise
for all i ∈ [n] and all v ∈ Vn.
In other words, we have C ′i(v, S) = C
′
j(v, S) for all i, j ∈ [n] with Ci(v, S), Cj(v, S) > 0, i.e. an
equal division of the payoff maxj∈S Cj(v, S) of coalition S to all contributing players. With this ter-
minology at hand we can state that the counting function of the absolute Johnston index CJS arises as
the equal division version of 2n−1 ·CBz. This correspondence is the reason why we have defined CBz
as C and not as C˜, see the equations before Definition 3.21. We have that
∑n
i=1
∑
S⊆N C
JS(v, S)
equals the number of winning coalitions with at least one critical player (without multiplicities).
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Similarly, the counting function of the absolute Deegan-Packel index CDP arises as the equal
division version of CPGI and the counting function of the absolute Shift-Deegan-Packel index CSDP
arises as the equal division version of CShift.
Directly from the definition of a counting function and the definition from a normalized power
index we conclude:
Lemma 3.23. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players, C be a counting function on Vn, and
P : Vn → Rn≥0 be the induced power index. Then the normalized power index P̂ is induced by the
counting function Ĉ = 1Λ · C, where
λ(v) =
n∑
i=1
∑
S⊆N
Ci(v, S)
for each v ∈ Vn, i.e. the scaling factor 1Λ may depend on the game v.
4. ALON-EDELMAN TYPE BOUNDS
In this section we establish a list of what we call Alon-Edelman type bounds or results for the
‖ · ‖1-distance between Boolean games and somewhat simplified or reduced Boolean games. We start
with the original result from [1] (slightly rewritten in our notation). To this end, we call a Boolean
game v : 2[n] → {0, 1} on n players k-pure if all players in (k, n] are null players.
theorem 4.1. (Alon and Edelman, 2010) Let n > k be positive integers, let ε < 1k+1 be a positive
real, and let v = (W, [n]) be a simple game on n players. If∑ni=k+1 B̂zi(v) ≤ ε, then there exists a
k-pure simple game v′ on n players so that
‖B̂z(v′)− B̂z(v)‖1 =
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣B̂zi(v′)− B̂zi(v)∣∣∣ ≤ (2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε.
In the following we will generalize this theorem for other power indices besides the (relative)
Banzhaf index. As a side effect, we will tighten the stated bound to a nicer expression. We go along
the lines of the original proof and generalize the underlying ideas. To this end, we separate smaller
parts and introduce additional notation aiming at a general framework for Alon-Edelman type results.
Instead of the (relative) Banzhaf index we want to use an almost arbitrary power index, which then
of course has to satisfy some technical conditions, since there are power indices for which a Alon-
Edelman type bound cannot exist (in the precise formulation that we will state shortly), as we will see
later on. To condense the mentioned technical conditions we introduce the property of being locally
approximable of a power index based on counting functions in Definition 4.11. The quality of the
local approximation is quantified with the aid of two functions, which in turn determine the bounds
of the Alon-Edelman type results. We will specify how the simplified k-pure game v′ arises from v,
i.e. we make the existence result constructive17, see Definition 4.7.
Anticipating the necessary notation given in Subsection 4.1, we can state our main theorem as
follows:
theorem 4.2. Let 0 < k < n be integers, P be a power index induced by a counting function C that
is locally approximable for the shortening function Γ : Vn → Vn with quality functions f1 and f2.
If P further satisfies the null player property and is positive18, then for each game v ∈ Vn and its
shortening v′ = Γ(v) ∈ Vn with
∑n
i=k+1 Pi(v) ≤ ε ·
∑n
i=1 Pi(v) we have
‖P (v′)− P (v)‖1 =
k∑
i=1
∣∣Pi(v′)− Pi(v)∣∣+ n∑
i=k+1
|Pi(v)| ≤ (kf1(k) + 1) · ε ·
n∑
i=1
Pi(v).
17This constructive reformulation was already implicitly contained in the proof of [1].
18see Definition 3.2.(4) and Definition 3.2.(2)
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If
n∑
i=k+1
P̂i(v) ≤ ε′, then we have
‖P̂ (v′)− P̂ (v)‖1 =
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣P̂i(v′)− P̂i(v)∣∣∣+ n∑
i=k+1
∣∣∣P̂i(v)∣∣∣ ≤ (f2(k) + kf1(k) + 1)ε′
for the normalized power index P̂ .
Proof. Since Pi(v) = Ci(v, 2N ) the condition
∑n
i=k+1 Pi(v) ≤ ε ·
∑n
i=1 Pi(v) can be rewritten as∑n
i=k+1Ci(v, 2
N ) ≤ ε · C(v, 2N ). From local approximability we conclude
k∑
i=1
∣∣Pi(v′)− Pi(v)∣∣ = k∑
i=1
∣∣Ci(v′, 2N )− Ci(v, 2N )∣∣ ≤ k · f1(k) · ε · C(v, 2N ),
where the ride hand side equals kf1(k)·ε·
∑n
i=1 Pi(v). Since P is positive we have
∑n
i=k+1 |Pi(v)| =∑n
i=k+1 Pi(v) ≤ ε ·
∑n
i=1 Pi(v), so that we can combine both inequalities to obtain the proposed
bound for ‖P (v′)− P (v)‖1.
‖P̂ (v′)− P̂ (v)‖1 =
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ci(v, 2N )C(v, 2N ) − Ci(v′, 2N )C(v′, 2N )
∣∣∣∣+ n∑
i=k+1
P̂i(v)
≤
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ci(v, 2N )C(v, 2N ) − Ci(v′, 2N )C(v, 2N )
∣∣∣∣+ k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ci(v′, 2N )C(v, 2N ) − Ci(v′, 2N )C(v′, 2N )
∣∣∣∣+ ε′
≤
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ci(v, 2N )− Ci(v′, 2N )C(v, 2N )
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣C(v′, 2N )− C(v, 2N )C(v′, 2N ) · C(v, 2N )
∣∣∣∣ · k∑
i=1
Ci(v
′, 2N ) + ε′
≤ (kf1(k) + f2(k) + 1) · ε′,
where we have used the triangle inequality for absolute values,
k∑
i=1
Ci(v
′, 2N ) = C(v′, 2N ), and local
approximability. 
The requirements of Theorem 4.2 are almost in one-to-one correspondence to those from Theo-
rem 4.1 except the additional requirement ε < 1k+1 for the Alon-Edelman result. This condition is
indeed necessary also in our context if we want to prevent from the case that Γ(v) = v′ equals ei-
ther one of the non-Boolean games (∅, [n]) or (2[n], [n]), see Corollary 4.10. As it will turn out in
Lemma 4.15 we can choose f2(k) = k + 1 for the absolute Banzhaf index, the following lemma
completes the correspondence (except for the tightness of the proposed upper bound).
Lemma 4.3. With the notation from Theorem 4.2 let ε < 1f2(k) or ε
′ < 1f2(k) . If we additionally
assume that P ((∅, [n])) = P ((2[n], [n])) = 0 and P (v) 6= 0, then v′ = Γ(v) /∈ {(∅, [n]), (2[n], [n])}.
Proof. At first we remark that
∑n
i=k+1 Pi(v) ≤ ε ·
∑n
i=1 Pi(v) is equivalent to
n∑
i=k+1
P̂i(v) ≤ ε′ for
ε = ε′, since P̂ is efficient. Thus we assume ε < 1f2(k) and it suffices to show P (v
′) 6= 0. If to the
contrary P (v′) = 0, then
‖P (v)‖1 = ‖P (v′)− P (v)‖1 =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Pi(v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (f2(k) + 1)ε · ‖P (v)‖1
due to local approximability, the relation Pi(v) = Ci(v, 2N ), and
∑n
i=1 Pi(v) = ‖P (v)‖1. For
ε < 1f2(k) and ‖P (v)‖1 > 0 this is impossible. 
Anticipating Lemma 4.15 we remark that Theorem 4.2 yields a tighter bound for the special case
of the Banzhaf index than Theorem 4.1, since we have
(2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε + ε > (2k + 2) ε
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for all k, ε > 0 19.
An application of Theorem 4.2 is given in Subsection 4.2. In the following subsections we give
the necessary technical framework and determine for which power indices the stated conditions are
satisfied (some cases will remain open nevertheless). For some of the power indices introduced
in Section 3 we can easily see that it makes no sense to ask for an Alon-Edelman type result like
Theorem 4.2. Our key assumption is that most of the power is concentrated on the first k voters.
Some power indices from the literature have the property that players individual power can differ
only up to a fix multiplicative constant independently from the given game.
Lemma 4.4. For each simple game v ∈ Sn we have
1
2
KBj(v) ≤ KBi(v) ≤ 2 KBj(v),
1
4
PHIj(v) ≤ PHIi(v) ≤ 4 PHIj(v),
1
2
Chowj(v) ≤ Chowi(v) ≤ 2 Chowj(v),
1
2
K̂Bj(v) ≤ K̂Bi(v) ≤ 2K̂Bj(v),
1
4
P̂HIj(v) ≤ P̂HIi(v) ≤ 4P̂HIj(v) and
1
2
Ĉhowj(v) ≤ Ĉhowi(v) ≤ 2Ĉhowj(v)
for all i, j ∈ [n].
Proof. Let v = (W, [n]) ∈ Sn, i ∈ [n] be arbitrary , and set Ai = W\Wi, i.e. the set of winning
coalitions that do not contain player i. Since v is simple we have |Ai| ≤ |Wi|, so that
1
2
· |W| ≤ |Wi| ≤ |W| ≤ 2 · |Wi| .
This directly gives the two inequalities for Chow and KB. Estimating the numerator and denominator
of PHI separately, gives the stated inequality for the Public Help index. Since the normalization is
the same for every player, we can also conclude the three remaining inequalities. 
We remark that more explicitly KBi(v) ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
, K̂Bi(v) ∈
(
1
2n ,
2
n
)
, PHIi(v) ∈
[
1
2n ,
2
n
]
, and
P̂HIi(v) ∈
(
1
4n ,
4
n
)
for all simple games v ∈ Sn and all players i ∈ [n].
4.1. Shortenings and locally approximable power indices.
Definition 4.5. For a Boolean game v = (W, [n]) and for A ⊆ [k] we define the reduced game20
vA = (WA, (k, n]), whereWA = {B ⊆ (k, n] : A ∪B ∈ W}.
We remark that vA consists of n− k players. It may happen that vA is not a Boolean game, but it
can be easily figured out that there are just three cases:
Lemma 4.6. For a Boolean game v = (W, [n]) ∈ Bn and a subset A ⊆ [k], where 0 < k < n,
(using the notation from Definition 4.5) we have one of the following possibilities:
(1) WA = ∅;
(2) WA = 2(k,n];
(3) vA = (WA, (k, n]) ∈ Bn−k.
We remark that the definition of k-pure for a Boolean game v = (W, [n]) is equivalent to requiring
WA ∈
{∅, 2(k,n]} for all A ⊆ [k]. If we aim to only perform a relatively small number of modifica-
tions to obtain a k-pure game v′ from a given n-pure game v, it makes sense to modifyWA only if it
is not contained in
{∅, 2(k,n]}. WheneverWA ∈ Bn−k we have two choices for the modification.
19We remark that the differences in the upper bounds are due to the tighter estimate of
∣∣∣B̂zi(v, 2N )− B̂zi(v′, 2N )∣∣∣ in
the second part of the proof of Theorem 4.2 compared to the estimation in [1]. The generalized bound would have been
‖P̂ (v′)− P̂ (v)‖1 ≤ (2kf1(k)+1)ε
′
1−(kf1(k)+1)ε′ + ε
′ using the original proof.
20See also [77, Definition 1.4.4, 1.4.7].
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Definition 4.7. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players. A mapping Γ : Vn × [n] → Vn is a
shortening function (on Vn) if
(1) v′ = Γ(v, k) is k-pure for all k ∈ [n], v ∈ Vn and
(2) for all U ⊆ [k] withWU ∈
{∅, 2(k,n]} we have v(U ∪ V ) = v′(U ∪ V ) for all V ∈ (k, n].
One special shortening function, that was already used in [1], is given by some kind of rounding
procedure:
Definition 4.8. For a given Boolean game v = (W, [n]) and an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n we denote
by v′ = (W, [n]) the game that arises from v as follows: for every A ⊆ [k] we set W ′A = ∅ if
|WA| ≤ |WA| andW ′A = 2(k,n] if |WA| > |WA|, whereWA = 2(k,n]−WA denotes the complement.
We call the mapping Γ that maps (v, k) to v′ the k-rounding.
The idea behind Definition 4.8 is to obtain a shortening function21 that modifies the minimal num-
ber of coalitions, i.e. the number of switches from winning to losing, or the other way round, is
minimized. We remark that k-rounding of a Boolean game v = (W, [n]) may result in a game
v′ = (W ′, [n]), where ∅ ∈ W ′ or [n] /∈ W ′, i.e. that v′ is not a Boolean game. But these are the only
exceptions and k-rounding preserves a number of meaningful properties:
Lemma 4.9. Let v = (W, [n]) ∈ Bn be a Boolean game and 1 ≤ k ≤ n be an integer such that the
k-rounding v′ = (W ′, [n]) of v is not equal to either (∅, [n]) or (2[n], [n]), then we have the following
implications
(1) ∅ /∈ W ′, [n] ∈ W ′⇒ v′ ∈ Bn;
(2) v simple⇒ v′ simple;
(3) v complete⇒ v′ complete;
(4) v weighted⇒ v′ weighted;
(5) v proper⇒ v′ proper;
(6) v strong and simple⇒ v′ strong.
Proof.
(1) Obviously v′ is a function of the form 2N → {0, 1} with N = [n]. The two other conditions
form exactly the missing part of Definition 2.1.
(2) Let S ⊆ T ⊆ [k] be two fixed coalitions and U ⊆ (k, n] be arbitrary. If S ∪ U is winning in
(W, [n]), then T ∪ U is winning in (W, [n]) sinceW is simple. Thus we have
|{U ⊆ (k, n] : S ∪ U ∈ W}| ≤ |{U ⊆ (k, n] : T ∪ U ∈ W}| .
If S is winning in (W ′, [n]), so is T . It remains to show ∅ /∈ W ′ and [n] ∈ W ′. Assume
∅ ∈ W ′, then all coalitions ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ [n] are winning, which contradictsW ′ 6= 2[n]. Similarly
assume [n] /∈ W ′, then all coalitions ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ [n] are losing, which contradicts W ′ 6= ∅.
Thus v′ = (W ′, [n]) is simple.
(3) Since every complete game is simple we conclude v′ ∈ Sn from (2). Now let S, T ⊆ [k] be
two fixed coalitions with S  T inW and U ⊆ (k, n] be arbitrary. We have that S ∪ U 
T ∪ U inW so that
|{U ⊆ (k, n] : S ∪ U ∈ W}| ≤ |{U ⊆ (k, n] : T ∪ U ∈ W}| .
Thus S  T in v′ and v′ = (W ′, [n]) is complete.
(4) Since every weighted game is simple, we conclude v′ ∈ Sn from (2). Now let [q;w1, . . . , wn]
be a weighted representation of v, where we w.l.o.g. assume wi ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Next
we use the weights w′1 = w1, . . . , w′k = wk, w
′
k+1 = 0, . . . , w
′
n = 0, i.e. w
′(X) = w′(X ∩
[k]) for all coalitions X ⊆ [n]. With this we denote the minimum weight w′(X) of a winning
coalition in X ∈ W ′ by u and the maximum weight w′(X) of a losing coalition X ∈ W ′
by l. Let S ⊆ [1, k] be a winning coalition S ∈ W ′ with weight w′(S) = u and T ⊆ [1, k]
be a losing coalition T /∈ W ′ with weight w′(T ) = l. For an arbitrary coalition V ⊆ [1, k],
21The operation k-rounding is indeed a shortening function Vn× [n]→ Vn for many of the most meaningful of classes
Vn of binary games mildly modified to satisfy a technical condition, see Lemma 4.9 and Corollary 4.10.
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with w′(V ) ≥ w′(S) = u, we have w(V ) ≥ w(S) = u and w(V ∪ U) ≥ w(S ∪ U) for all
U ⊆ (k, n], so that
|{U ⊆ (k, n] : V ∪ U ∈ W}| ≥ |{U ⊆ (k, n] : S ∪ U ∈ W}| .
Thus, V has to be winning in v′ = (W ′, [n]) and we clearly have l < u.
For an arbitrary coalition V ′ ⊆ [1, k] with w′(V ′) < w′(S) = u, we have w(V ′) <
w(S) = u and coalition V ′ is losing in v′ due to the definition of u. Thus, w′(V ′) ≤ w′(T ) =
l due to the definition of l and [q′;w1, . . . , wk, 0, . . . , 0] is a weighted representation of v′ for
each q′ ∈ (l, u].
(5) Let S ⊆ [1, k] be an arbitrary coalition and T = [1, k]\S. By m1 we denote the number of
coalitions U ⊆ (k, n] such that S∪U is winning in v. Similarly, bym2 we denote the number
of coalitions U ⊆ (k, n] such that T ∪ ((k, n]\U) is losing in v. If S ∪ U is winning in v,
where U ⊆ (k, n], then T ∪ ((k, n]\U) is losing in v due to the fact that v is proper. Thus, we
have m1 +m2 ≤ 2n−k. Due to the rounding procedure, S is winning in v′ iff m1 > 2n−k−1.
Similarly, T is winning in v′ iff m2 > 2n−k−1. Both cases cannot occur simultaneously so
that we conclude that v′ is proper.
(6) We use the same notation as in (5). If S ∪ U is losing in v, where U ⊆ (k, n], then T ∪
((k, n]\U) is winning in v due to the fact that v is strong. Thus m1 +m2 ≥ 2n−k. Due to the
rounding procedure S is losing in v′ iff m1 ≤ 2n−k−1 and T is losing in v′ iff m2 ≤ 2n−k−1.
Thus both coalitions can be losing simultaneously in v′ if and only ifm1 = m2 = 2n−k−1, i.e.
exactly one of the two coalitions S∪U and T ∪ ((k, n]\U) is winning in v for all U ⊆ (k, n].
Since game is strong, m1 > 0, and v is simple the coalition S ∪ (k, n] has to be winning in
v. Thus T ∪ ∅ has to be losing in v. But then all coalitions T ∪ ((k, n]\U) would be losing
so that m2 = 0. Thus the case m1 = m2 = 2n−k−1 is not possible for simple games and we
can conclude that v′ is strong.

For |WA| = |WA| the chosen tie-breaking rule in Definition 4.8 makes the additional assumption of
being a simple game in implication (6) of Lemma 4.9 necessary. If we modify the tie-breaking rule in
the other direction implications (1)-(4) and implication (6), without the assumption of being a simple
game, remain valid. For implication (5) we then need the assumption of being a simple game (or
possibly a relaxation).
Corollary 4.10. For each integer 1 ≤ k < n the operation of k-rounding, interpreted as a mapping
Vn × [n]→ Vn, is a shortening function for
Vn ∈
{{
v : v : 2[n] → {0, 1}
}
,Sn ∪ Xn, Cn ∪ Xn, Tn ∪ Xn
}
,
where Xn =
{
(∅, [n]), (2[n], [n])}.
Definition 4.11. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players, Γ : Vn × [n]→ Vn be a shortening
function on Vn, and P : Vn → Rn≥0 be a power index induced by a counting function C : Vn ×
2[n] × [n] → Rn≥0 on Vn. We say that P and C are locally approximable for Γ (on Vn), if there exist
functions f1 : N>0 → R≥0 and f2 : N>0 → R≥0 such that for all integers 1 ≤ k < n, all real
constants ε ≥ 0, and all games v = (W, [n]) ∈ Vn with
∑n
i=k+1Ci(v, 2
N ) ≤ ε · C(v, 2N ), we have
(1) Ci(v, 2N )− f1(k) · ε · C(v, 2N ) ≤ Ci(Γ(v), 2N ) ≤ Ci(v, 2N ) + f1(k) · ε · C(v, 2N )
(2) C(v, 2N )− f2(k) · ε · C(v, 2N ) ≤ C(Γ(v), 2N ) ≤ C(v, 2N ) + f2(k) · ε · C(v, 2N )
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where N = [n].
In other words, the assumptions from Definition 4.11 say that, if for a given game v the contribution∑n
i=k+1Ci(v, 2
N ) of the last n − k players is relatively small, compared to the total contribution
C(v, 2N ), then the aggregated counting function Ci(Γ(v), 2N ) of the shortened game Γ(v) is near22
to the aggregated counting function Ci(v, 2N ) of the game itself.
If a given locally approximable counting function is multiplied by a positive constant factor, not
depending on the respective game, then the quality functions remain valid:
22with respect to the ‖ · ‖1-norm
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Lemma 4.12. Let Vn be a class of binary games on n players, Γ : Vn × [n] → Vn be a shortening
function on Vn, and P : Vn → Rn≥0 be a power index induced by a counting function C : Vn× 2[n]×
[n]→ Rn≥0 on Vn. If P and C are locally approximable for Γ on Vn with quality functions f1 and f2,
then C ′ = C · Λ and the corresponding induced power index P ′ = P · Λ are locally approximable
for Γ on Vn with the same quality functions f1 and f2, where Λ ∈ R>0.
We remark that there is a canonical choice for the function f2 when we are only given a function
f1 satisfying the respective requirements from Definition 4.11.
Lemma 4.13. If f1 satisfies condition (1) of Definition 4.11, then f2(k) := k · f1(k) + 1 satisfies
condition (2) of Definition 4.11.
Corollary 4.14. Given the assumptions of Theorem 4.2 with f2(k) := k · f1(k) + 1 according to
Lemma 4.13, we have
‖P̂ (v′)− P̂ (v)‖1 ≤ (2kf1(k) + 2)ε′
For many power indices we will subsequently only state a suitable choice for f1 and not for f2,
whenever we do not know a feasible function f2 such that the corresponding bounds of Theorem 4.2
are tighter than those from Corollary 4.14. For some power indices a tighter choice for f2 pays off.
Lemma 4.15. The counting function CBz of the absolute Banzhaf index is locally approximable, with
fBz1 (k) = 1 and f
Bz
2 (k) = k + 1, for k-rounding on all binary voting classes Vn, where k-rounding
is a shortening function, i.e. where games remain in Vn after rounding.
To ease notation we will, instead of this precise technical statement, say that fBz1 (k) = 1 and
fBz2 (k) = k + 1 are feasible for C
Bz and k-rounding in the following and in similar situations. As in
Theorem 4.2 we call f1, f2 quality functions.
Proof. (of Lemma 4.15, compare [1])
Let v = (W, [n]) be a game. Suppose that for i ∈ (k, n] and B ⊆ [n] we have that i /∈ B, B /∈ W ,
but B ∪ i ∈ W . Let A = B ∩ [1, k] and B′ = B −A, then i /∈ B′, B′ /∈ WA, but B′ ∪ i ∈ WA. This
correspondence implies that for every k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have
CBzj (v, 2
N ) =
∑
A⊆[k]
CBzj
(
(WA, (k, n]), 2N
)
.
From the edge-isoperimetric inequality for the cube-graph23 one concludes
C
Bz
(
(F , [n]), 2N
)
≥ |F|(n− log2 |F|)
for all F ⊆ 2[n], so that
C
Bz
(
(F , [n]), 2N
)
≥ min{|F|, ∣∣F|∣∣} .
Thus we have
ε · CBz(v, 2N ) ≥
n∑
i=k+1
CBzi (v, 2
N ) =
n∑
i=k+1
∑
A⊆[k]
CBzi
(
(WA, (k, n]), 2N
)
≥
∑
A⊆[k]
min
{|WA|, ∣∣WA∣∣} .
From Lemma 4.16, see below, we then conclude the feasibility of fBz1 (k) = 1, so that Lemma 4.13
then gives the feasibility of fBz2 (k) = kf
Bz
1 (k) + 1 = k + 1. 
Lemma 4.16. [29, Lemma 3.3.12] Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and N 6= T ∈ W be a
minimal winning coalition. For the simple game v′ arising by deleting T from the set of winning
coalitions we have
ηi(v
′) =
{
ηi(v)− 1 : i ∈ T,
ηi(v) + 1 : i ∈ N\T.
23See also [26, Corollary 1].
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We remark that for all of the power indices introduced in Section 3, except for the nucleolus and
the MSR index, similar recursion formulas as in Lemma 4.16 exist.
From Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.15 we conclude:
Corollary 4.17. The quality functions f1(k) = 1 and f2(k) = k+ 1 are feasible for the vector of the
number of i-swings (η1, . . . , ηn), i.e. the Banzhaf score, given by the counting function
Ci(v, S) =
{
1 : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
and k-rounding.
Lemma 4.18. Let the quality functions f1 and f2 be feasible for a power index P induced by a
counting functionC and α ∈ R≥0 be a constant. The shifted counting functionC ′i(v, S) = Ci(v, S)+
α
2n , where n is the number of players in v, induces the power index P
′ = P+α and f1, f2 are feasible
for C ′ and P ′ too.
Proof. At first we observe
P ′i (v) =
∑
S⊆[n]
C ′i(v, S) = α+
∑
S⊆[n]
Ci(v, S) = α+ Pi(v).
With the notation of Definition 4.11 we have
C ′i(Γ(v), 2
N ) = Ci(Γ(v), 2
N ) + α
≤ Ci(v, 2N ) + α+ f1(k) · ε · C(v, 2N )
= C ′i(v, 2
N ) + f1(k) · ε · C(v, 2N )
≤ C ′i(v, 2N ) + f1(k) · ε · C ′(v, 2N ),
since f1(k), ε, α ≥ 0. Similarly we obtain
C ′i(Γ(v), 2
N ) ≥ C ′i(v, 2N )− f1(k) · ε · C ′(v, 2N )
and
C
′
(v, 2N )− f2(k) · ε · C ′(v, 2N ) ≤ C ′(Γ(v), 2N ) ≤ C ′(v, 2N ) + f2(k) · ε · C ′(v, 2N ).

In combination Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.18 say that we can transfer quality functions for a
given power index P , induced by counting function, to all power indices P ′ = α + βP , where
α ∈ R≥0 and β ∈ R>0. As an application we mention the following corollary based on the identity
Rae = 12 +
1
2 · Bz:
Corollary 4.19. The quality functions f1(k) = 1 and f2(k) = k + 1 are feasible for the Rae index
and k-rounding.
In Subsection 4.3 we will state the respective quality functions, so that Theorem 4.2 can be applied,
for most of the power indices introduced in Section 3. Most of the proofs, based on elementary
counting and bookkeeping considerations, will be delayed to the appendix. For p-binomial semivalues
it will turn out that no such result based on k-rounding can exist, for the Johnston index even the
larger class of shortening functions admits no such result. In order to prove those negative results,
we introduce a parameterized class of weighted games in Subsection 4.4. Now we proceed with an
application of Theorem 4.2 in the next subsection.
4.2. Applications. We would like to demonstrate how to apply Theorem 4.2 to deduce some infor-
mation on power vectors that are hard to approximate. Assume that we want to find a simple game
with normalized Banzhaf vector σn =
(
3
4 ,
1
4 , . . .
)
, where the number of players n ≥ 2 is arbitrary. It
will turn out that no simple game can exactly meet the desired power distribution σn, so that we aim
at minimizing the ‖ · ‖1-distance between σn and the realized Banzhaf distribution Bz(v). The idea
is to use negative approximation results for games on k < n players and then to apply Theorem 4.2
to conclude lower bounds for arbitrary n. For this purpose we need to bridge the gap between a k-
pure game on n players (as in Theorem 4.2) and the resulting k-player game after removing the null
players.
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Definition 4.20. A power index P : Vi → Ri≥0 is called null player removable if for all v ∈ Vn and
v′ ∈ Vk, arising from v by deleting the null players, we have Pj(v) = Pj(v′) for all players j, which
are not null players in v.
Both, the normalized and the absolute Banzhaf index are null player removable while the index
based on the number of i-swings, is not. For the later case the number of i-swings for all non-null
players doubles for each added extra null player.
theorem 4.21. Let 0 < k < n be integers, σ ∈ Rn≥0 be a desired power vector with ‖σ‖1 = 1, P
be a power index induced by a counting function C that is locally approximable for the shortening
function Γ : Vn → Vn with quality functions f1 and f2. If P further is positive, satisfies the null
player property, P̂ is null player removable, and min
{
Λ+α
β+2 ,
1
f2(k)
}
≥ α, then we have
‖P̂ (v)− σ‖1 ≥ min
{
2 ·
(
1
f2(k)
− α
)
,
2
β + 2
· Λ− 2β + 2
β + 2
· α
}
,
where σ′ = (σ1, . . . , σk), α = 1−‖σ′‖1, β = f2(k)+kf1(k)+1, and Λ = minv′∈Vk ‖σ′− P̂ (v′)‖1,
for all v ∈ Vn.
Proof. Let v ∈ Vn be arbitrary and v′ = Γ(v) ∈ Vk. For ε < 1f2(k) with
i∑
i=k+1
P̂i(v) ≤ ε we obtain
‖P̂ (v′)− P̂ (v)‖1 ≤ (f2(k) + kf1(k) + 1)ε
from Theorem 4.2. Applying the triangle inequality for ‖ · ‖1 gives
‖P̂ (v)− σ‖1 ≥ ‖P̂ (v′)− σ′‖1 − ‖P̂ (v′)− P̂ (v)‖1 − (1− ‖σ′‖1).
If otherwise
i∑
i=k+1
P̂i(v) > ε, then
‖P̂ (v)− σ‖1 =
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣P̂i(v)− σi∣∣∣+ n∑
i=k+1
∣∣∣P̂i(v)− σi∣∣∣ ≥ 2 ·max{‖σ′‖1 − 1 + ε, 0} .
Now it remains to choose a suitable ε such that the weakest of the two lower bounds is maximized. If
Λ+α
β+2 <
1
f2(k)
, then we can choose ε = Λ+αβ+2 so that both right hand sides are equal to
2
β+2 ·Λ− 2β+2β+2 ·α.
Now assume Λ+αβ+2 ≥ 1f2(k) . If α = 1f2(k) , then the proposed inequality is true due to ‖P̂ (v)−σ‖1 ≥ 0,
so that we can additionally assume 1f2(k) > α. Finally we consider
lim
ε→ 1
f2(k)
:α<ε< 1
f2(k)
min
{
Λ− α− β, 2(ε− α)
}
= 2 ·
(
1
f2(k)
− α
)
.

As an example we choose n ≥ 3, σ =
(
29
40 ,
9
40 ,
1
20(n−2) , . . . ,
1
20(n−2)
)
, P = Bz, Γ as k-rounding
and Vi = Si ∪
{
(∅, [i]), (2[i], [i])}, i.e. the set of simple games supplemented by the two trivial non-
Boolean games for technical reasons. For k = 2 we have α = 120 and Λ =
1
2 , since the only
achievable Banzhaf distributions are (1, 0),
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, and (0, 1). From Lemma 4.15 we read of β = 6
and f2(2) = 3. Inserting yields ‖B̂z(v)− σ‖1 ≥ 380 for all v ∈ Sn, i.e. σ cannot be approximated too
well by Banzhaf distributions within the class of simple games.
Corollary 4.22. Let 1 < k < n be integers, σ = (σ1, . . . , σk, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn≥0 be a desired power
vector with ‖σ‖1 = 1, P ∈ {Bz,ColPrev,ColIni,PGI,DP,Shift, SDP} be a power index, V ∈
{S, C, T } be a class of games, then
‖P̂ (v)− σ‖1 ≥ min
{
2
fP2 (k)
,
2Λ
fP2 (k) + kf
P
1 (k) + 3
}
,
σ′ = (σ1, . . . , σk), Λ = minv′∈Vk ‖σ′ − P̂ (v′)‖1 and the corresponding fP1 , fP2 can be found in
Table 1, for all v ∈ Vn.
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Proof. For V ′i = Vi ∪
{
(∅, [i]), (2[i], [i])} the operation k-rounding is a shortening function V ′n → V ′i.
For v ∈ {(∅, [n]), (2[n], [n])} we have ‖P̂ (v) − σ‖1 = 1 so that the proposed bound is valid due
to fP2 (2) ≥ 2 for all cases of P . Thus we can assume v ∈ Vn. With the notation from Theo-
rem 4.21 we have α = 0 and all requirements on P are satisfied. Since min
{
Λ+α
β+2 ,
1
f2(k)
}
≥ 0 and
minv′∈Vk ‖σ′ − P̂ (v′)‖1 ≥ minv′∈V ′k ‖σ′ − P̂ (v′)‖1 we can conclude the proposed bound from the
bound of Theorem 4.21. 
As an example we consider σn =
(
3
4 ,
1
4 , 0, . . . , 0
)
for n ≥ 3, P = Bz, and k = 2. Corollary 4.22
then yields ‖B̂z(v) − σ‖1 ≥ 18 for all simple games v ∈ Sn. We remark that in [46] the bound
‖B̂z(v) − σ‖1 ≥ 19 was proven based on the original Alon-Edelman bound. Computational results
for the corresponding exact solutions of the inverse power index problem for simple games with up
to 11 players lead to the conjecture ‖Bz(v)− σn‖1 ≥ 13 (and indeed a even tighter one).
4.3. Quality functions for several power indices. Having the theoretical framework of the preced-
ing subsections at hand it remains to prove the validity of suitable quality functions for the different
power indices in order to conclude the respective Alon-Edelman type results. In contrast to the proof
of Lemma 4.15 for the Banzhaf index, where the edge-isoperimetric inequality for the cube-graph
was used, we will only need elementary counting and bookkeeping arguments. Exemplarily, we state
the proof for the quality functions for the Public Good Index. In the following we will abbreviate the
term minimal winning coalition by MWC.
Lemma 4.23. For the Public Good Index we can choose f1(k) = k + 1 and f2(k) = (k+1)(k+5)4 .
Proof. Let v = (W, [n]) be an arbitrary simple game. As defined before, CPGIi (v, 2[n]) counts
the number of minimal winning coalitions in v containing player i and we have CPGI(v, 2[n]) =∑n
i=1C
PGI
i (v, 2
[n]). For brevity we just write Ci and C. As further abbreviations we use v′ =
(W ′, [n]) for the k-rounding of v, Ĉ = ∑ni=k+1Ci, i.e. the restriction of C to the players in (k, n],
and by M̂ we denote the number of minimal winning coalitions inW that contain at least one player
from (k, n]. With this we have M̂ ≤ Ĉ.
Now we want to study the changes in the number Ci of minimal winning coalitions by going from
v to v′. At first we consider the cases where a coalition S is a MWC in v but not in v′.
(1) If S ∩ (k, n] 6= ∅, then S is a MWC containing a player from (k, n], so that for a given index
1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ci decreases by at most M̂ .
(2) Let us assume S ⊆ [k]. Since S is a MWC in v, it is indeed winning in v. Thus S ∪ T is
winning in v for all T ⊆ (k, n], so that S is also winning in v′. Since S is not a MWC in
v′, there exists a player j ∈ S such that S − j is also winning in v′. This can only happen
if there is a subset ∅ 6= T ⊆ (k, n] such that S − j + T is a MWC in v. So the change of a
MWC S − j + T can cause the change of a MWC S. Now we want to count how often this
can happen. To this end we set r := |S − j| and remark 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1, since ∅ can not be
winning in v′ (our conditions ensure that also v′ is a simple game). If i ∈ S − j, then we
have k − r possibilities and one possibility otherwise. Thus, for a given index 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ci
decreases by at most M̂(k − 1).
The overall decrease of all Ci with 1 ≤ i ≤ k can be bounded a bit tighter than M̂(k−1)k
as follows. For S we have k − r possibilities for the r players in S − j and 1 possibility for
the remaining k − r players in [k]. Since (r + 1)(k − r) ≤ (k+1)24 , the overall decrease is at
most M̂ · (k+1)24 .
Next we consider the cases where a coalition S is not a MWC in v but a MWC in v′. Since the players
in (k, n] are null players in v′, we deduce S ⊆ [k].
(3) Assume that S is losing in v but winning in v′. According to the rounding procedure, there
exists a MWC S ∪T in v, where T ⊆ (k, n]. Thus, for a given index 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ci increases
by at most M̂ .
(4) If S is winning in v, then there must be a player j ∈ S so that S − j is also winning in v, but
losing in v′. According to the rounding procedure, there exists a MWC S− j ∪T in v, where
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T ⊆ (k, n]. We proceed similarly as in case (2) and set r := |S − j|, so that 0 ≤ r ≤ k − 1.
Thus, for a given index 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ci increases by at most M̂ · k and the overall increase is
at most M̂ · (k+1)24 .
Summarizing the four cases gives
CPGIi (v, 2
N )− (k + 1)Ĉ ≤ CPGIi (v, 2N )− k · M̂ ≤ CPGIi (v′, 2N )
and
CPGIi (v
′, 2N ) ≤ CPGIi (v, 2N ) + (k + 1)M̂ ≤ CPGIi (v, 2N ) + (k + 1)Ĉ
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since Ĉ ≤ ε · CPGI(v, 2N ), we can choose f1(k) = k + 1.
Using Ĉ ≤ ε · CPGI(v, 2N ) and
n∑
i=k+1
CPGIi (v
′, 2n) = 0, we obtain
C
PGI
(v, 2N )− (k + 1)(k + 5)− 4
4
· M̂ ≤ CPGI(v′, 2N )
and
C
PGI
(v′, 2N ) ≤ CPGI(v, 2N ) + (k + 1)(k + 5)− 4
4
· M̂ + ε · CPGI(v, 2N ),
so that we can choose f2(k) =
(k+1)(k+5)
4 . 
In Table 1 we state suitable quality functions for 11 different power indices, whose proofs all are
rather similar to that of Lemma 4.23 and therefore shifted to Appendix A. We have to remark, that for
the Tijs index we do not use k-rounding but k-up-rounding, i.e. we setW ′A = 2(k,n] if |WA| ≥ 1 and
W ′A = ∅ (using the notation from Definition 4.8).
power index f1(k) f2(k) justification
Tijs 0 1 Lemma A.8
Bz 1 k + 1 Lemma 4.15
swing = 2n−1 · Bz 1 k + 1 Lemma 4.12
ΨP with c1 ≤ Pi ≤ c2,
where c1, c2 ∈ R>0, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 c2c1 c2c1 · (k + 1) Lemma A.11
ColPrev 2 2k + 1 Lemma A.9
ColIni 2 2k + 1 Lemma A.10
Rae 1 k + 1 Lemma 4.12 and 4.18 (or Corollary 4.19)
PGI k + 1 (k+1)(k+5)4 Lemma 4.23
DP k + 2 k
2+6k+9
4 Lemma A.3
Shift k+32
k2+3k+2
2 Lemma A.5
SDP 2k + 1 2k2 + k + 1 Lemma A.7
TABLE 1. Quality functions for several power indices
4.4. A parameterized class of weighted games and negative results. In this section we construct
a parametric example in order to obtain negative results for p-binomial semivalues and the Johnston
index with respect to the existence of Alon-Edelman type results.
Definition 4.24. For integers l, k,m, n with 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1, n ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ m ≤ n + 1, we define
the simple game vk,ln,m given by its set of minimal winning coalitions
{U ⊆ [k] : |U | = l, U 6= T} ∪ {T ∪ V : V ⊆ (k, k + n], |V | = m},
where T = (k − l, k].
We remark that the number of players of vk,ln,m is given by n+ k and not by n (as everywhere else
within this paper). The players come in at most three different types.
Lemma 4.25. For integers l, k,m, n satisfying the restrictions from Definition 4.24 the simple game
vk,ln,m is weighted.
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Proof. Form /∈ {0, n+1} a weighted representation is given by [q;w1 = a, . . . , wk−l = a,wk−l+1 =
b, . . . , wk = b, wk+1 = 1, . . . , wn+k = 1], where b = (l − 2)m + n + 1, a = (l − 1)m + n + 1,
and q = lb + m = (l − 1)2m + l(n + 1). For m = n + 1 a weighted representation is given by
[q = l2 + 1;w1 = l + 1, . . . , wk−l = l + 1, wk−l+1 = l, . . . , wk = l, wk+1 = 0, . . . , wn+k = 0]
and for m = 0 a weighted representation is given by [q = l;w1 = 1, . . . , wk−l = 1, wk−l+1 =
1, . . . , wk = 1, wk+1 = 0, . . . , wn+k = 0]. 
The family of parametric games vk,ln,m has several useful properties: As just mention the games
weighted, i.e. belong to the most narrow class Tn of binary games that we are considering in this
paper. With the help of the parameters l, k,m, n one can, to some degree, control the power of the
players in [1, k − k] and of those in (k, k + n]. The games vk,ln,m are almost k-pure, i.e. T is the only
coalition S ⊆ [k] such that the reduced gameWS is a simple game. In other words, each shortening
function can just modify coalitions of the form T ∪V , where V ⊆ (k, k+n]. Since in a k-pure game
it only depends on T whether the T ∪ V are winning or losing, there are just two possible choices.
Turning T ∪ V into losing coalitions for all V ⊆ (k, k + n] results in vk,ln,n+1 and turning T ∪ V into
losing winning for all V ⊆ (k, k + n] results in vk,ln,0. For the special shortening function k-rounding
we can explicitly state which case occurs:
Lemma 4.26. Let Γ denote the operation of k-rounding and l, k,m, n be integers satisfying the
restrictions from Definition 4.24. Then we have
Γ
(
vk,ln,m
)
=
{
vk,ln,0 : m ≤ bn/2c,
vk,ln,n+1 : otherwise.
We want to study the absolute difference of individual power between the three games vk,ln,m, v
k,l
n,n+1,
and vk,ln,0 for the (at most) three types of players [1, k− l], (k− l, j], and (k, k+n]. As an abbreviation
we introduce:
Definition 4.27. For each positive power index P : Vn → R≥0 satisfying the null player property
and each integers l, k,m, n satisfying the restrictions from Definition 4.24, we set
∆1,P1,2 =
∣∣∣Pi(vk,ln,m)− Pi(vk,ln,n+1)∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ [1, k − l],
∆2,P1,2 =
∣∣∣Pi(vk,ln,m)− Pi(vk,ln,n+1)∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ (k − 1, k],
∆3,P1,2 =
∣∣∣Pi(vk,ln,m)− Pi(vk,ln,n+1)∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ (k, k + n],
∆1,P1,3 =
∣∣∣Pi(vk,ln,m)− Pi(vk,ln,0)∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ [1, k − l],
∆2,P1,3 =
∣∣∣Pi(vk,ln,m)− Pi(vk,ln,0)∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ (k − 1, k],
∆3,P1,3 =
∣∣∣Pi(vk,ln,m)− Pi(vk,ln,0)∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ (k, k + n], and
ξP =
k+n∑
i=k+1
Pi(v
k,l
n,m).
In other words, ξP is the aggregated power of the players in (k, k+n] of the game vk,ln,m. For v
k,l
n,n+1
and vk,ln,0 the corresponding aggregated power equals zero so that we have ξ
P = n∆3,P1,2 = n∆
3,P
1,3 .
Our first aim is to show that there can be no Alon-Edelman type result for p-binomial semivalues
with p 6= 12 and k-rounding, i.e. the Banzhaf index is unique within the class of p-binomial semivalues
with respect to this property. To this end we prove the following limit results in Subsection B.1.
Lemma 4.28. Let P = Ψp and k, l be integers with 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1.
(1) For m =
⌈
n+1
2
⌉
, p ∈ (12 , 1) we have limn→∞ ∆1,P1,2ξP →∞ and limn→∞ ∆2,P1,2ξP →∞.
(2) For m =
⌊
n
2
⌋
, p ∈ (0, 12) we have limn→∞ ∆1,P1,3ξP →∞ and limn→∞ ∆3,P1,2ξP →∞.
(3) For m ∈ { ⌈n+12 ⌉ , ⌊n2 ⌋ } and p ∈ (0, 1)\{12} we have limn→∞ ξP = 0.
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We remark that (3) is not valid for p = 12 . Next we bound the overall ‖ · ‖1-distance between vk,ln,m
and vk,ln,n+1 or v
k,l
n,0:
Lemma 4.29. For p ∈ (0, 1)\{12} and integers l, k,m, n satisfying the restrictions from Defini-
tion 4.24 we have∣∣∣∣∣
n+k∑
i=1
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,m)−
n+k∑
i=1
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,n+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k · pl−1(1− p)k−l−1 + ξΨp
and ∣∣∣∣∣
n+k∑
i=1
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,m)−
n+k∑
i=1
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,0)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k · pl−1(1− p)k−l−1 + ξΨp .
For the proof we refer the reader to Subsection B.1. By suitably choosing k and l we can achieve
that the bound of Lemma 4.29 guarantees a small chance between vk,ln,m and its k-rounding. l =
⌈
k
2
⌉
and k sufficiently large but fix will do the job. Next we can increase n and apply Lemma 4.28.
Since the values f1(k), f2(k) of the hypothetical quality functions would be finite and we can choose
ε = ξP , an Alon-Edelman type result cannot exist for k-rounding.
theorem 4.30. For k ∈ N, p ∈ (0, 1)\{12}, Tn ⊆ Vn being compatible with k-rounding, no Alon-
Edelman type result for Ψp and k-rounding can exist.
Since the changes can be made arbitrarily small, due to Lemma 4.29, the corresponding statement
for the normalized p-binomial semivalue is also valid. Having a closer look at the proofs of the
technical bounds in Subsection B.1 we observe that the argumentation will break down if we slightly
adopt the shortening function k-rounding.
Definition 4.31. For a given Boolean game v = (W, [n]), a real constant p ∈ (0, 1), and an integer
1 ≤ k ≤ n we denote by v′ = (W, [n]) the game that arises from v as follows: for every A ⊆ [k] we
setW ′A = ∅ if |WA| ≤ p · 2n−k andW ′A = 2(k,n] if |WA| > p · 2n−k. We call the mapping Γ that
maps (v, k) to v′ the (p, k)-rounding.
In this new notation our old k-rounding is denoted as
(
1
2 , k
)
-rounding. There might be an intuition
for this special choice. Taking as p the probability for voting yes for each player, the expected number
of winning coalitions inWA would be p·2n−k. In some sense one would compare the present situation
of the reduced game to the expected situation and rounds with respect to this threshold. Admittedly,
this interpretation might not carry very far or even be wrong. Nevertheless we state:
Conjecture 4.32. For k ∈ N, p ∈ (0, 1), Tn ⊆ Vn being compatible with (p, k)-rounding, Alon-
Edelman type results for Ψp and (p, k)-rounding do exist.
Although we have tested the validity of Conjecture 4.32 for several examples, it remains unclear,
if just counting the number of winning coalitions in the respective reduces games is detailed enough
so that (p, k)-rounding works as expected. We remark that at the very least, there are generalizations
of the edge-isoperimetric inequality for the cube-graph with a binomial probability distribution with
expectation p, see e.g. [27, 28].
We want to complete this subsection with the discussion of the Johnston index, which does, inter-
estingly enough, not admit an Alon-Edelman type result for any shortening function. To this end we
consider the games vk,1n,m and state the following inequalities :
Lemma 4.33. For integers n = 2n˜+ 1 ≥ 3 odd, l = 1, m = n˜+ 1, and k ≥ 2 we have
‖ JS(vk,ln,m)− JS(vk,ln,n+1)‖1 ≥
(
k ·
√
n˜√
2
+ 1
)
ξJS,
‖ JS(vk,ln,m)− JS(vk,ln,0)‖1 ≥
(
(k − 1) ·
√
n˜√
2
+ 1
)
ξJS, and
lim
n˜→∞
ξJS
n+k∑
i=1
JSi(v
k,l
n,m)
= 0.
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Having Lemma 4.33 at hand, whose proof is delayed to Subsection B.2, we can conclude that for
the absolute Johnston index rounding up or down does not yield the desired approximation result for
all n ∈ N.
theorem 4.34. For Tn ⊆ Vn being compatible with an arbitrary shortening function Γ on Vn, no
Alon-Edelman type result for JS and Γ can exist.
Theorem 4.34 leaves little room for an approximation result similar to Theorem 4.2, since our
only restriction is that of using a shortening function. So in principle it may exist an approximation
result but only with a more dramatic change of the game. For the normalized Johnston index J˜S the
following bounds let us draw a similar conclusion:
Lemma 4.35. For integers n = 2n˜ + 1 odd, l = 1, m = n˜ + 1, and k ≥ 2, where n˜ is sufficiently
large, we have
‖ĴS(vk,ln,m)− ĴS(vk,ln,n+1)‖1 ≥
1
5k
,
‖ĴS(vk,ln,m)− ĴS(vk,ln,0)‖1 ≥
1
5k
, and
lim
n˜→∞
ξĴS = 0.
5. ILP FORMULATIONS FOR THE EXACT SOLUTION OF THE INVERSE POWER INDEX PROBLEM
In this section we will develop a generic integer linear programming formulation for the exact
solution of the inverse power index problem for power indices based on the idea of counting functions.
They mimic and generalize the ideas from [46], where the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index have
been treated.
5.1. The classes of underlying Boolean games. In order to model a Boolean game v : 2N → {0, 1}
we introduce binary variables xS ∈ {0, 1} for all coalitions S ⊆ N with the meaning xS = v(S), i.e.
xS = 1 for winning and x− S = 0 for losing coalitions. The two conditions, v(∅) = 0 and v(N), of
Definition 2.1 can then be written as x∅ = 0 and xN = 0. Next we state the conditions to model the
refinements of Boolean games described in Section 2.
The incidence vectors xS of the winning coalitions of a Boolean game correspond to a simple game
if the constraints
xS\{i} ≤ xS ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ N, i ∈ S (1)
are satisfied. For complete simple games we assume 1  2  · · ·  n, i.e. the players are numbered
from the most powerful to the least powerful. Here a set of sufficient conditions is given by
xS∪{k(S)+1}\{k(S)} ≤ xS ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ N\n and (2)
xS\{n} ≤ xS ∀{n} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (3)
where k(S) = max{i | i ∈ S} denotes the maximum index of a player in coalition S. We remark
that the inequalities (2) and (3) dominate the inequalities (1).
For weighted games we use the inequalities (2) and (3) for complete simple games and additionally
introduce the variables q, w1, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 for the quota and the weights of the players. It is a well
known fact that each weighted game admits a representation where all weights and the quota are
integers. Being slightly less restrictive we assume a weighted representation where the weight of
every winning coalition is at least one more than the weight of an arbitrary losing coalition, i.e. we
assume w(S) ≥ q for all winning coalitions S ⊆ N and w(T ) ≤ q − 1 for all losing coalitions
T ⊆ N . To this end we can require that the quota is at least one:
q ≥ 1. (4)
The assumed ordering of the players of the underlying complete simple game induces an ordering on
the weights:
wi ≤ wi+1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. (5)
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It remains to interlink the weights wi with the incidences xS :
q − (1− xS) ·M −
∑
i∈S
wi ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N and (6)
q + xS ·M −
∑
i∈S
wi ≥ 1 ∀S ⊆ N, (7)
where M is an suitably large constant fulfilling M ≥
n∑
i=1
wi. (According to [62, Theorem 9.3.2.1]
we may choose M = 4n
(
n+1
4
)(n+1)/2.) For a winning coalition S, i.e. xS = 1, inequality (6) is
equivalent to
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. Similarly, for a losing coalition T , i.e. xT = 0, inequality (7) is equivalent
to
∑
i∈S wi ≤ q − 1. The two other combinations are equivalent to automatically true inequalities if
M is chosen sufficiently large. More concretely, for a winning coalition S inequality (7) is equivalent
to
∑
i∈S wi ≤ q − 1 + M , which in turn is true due to M ≤ q − 1 + M and M ≥
n∑
i=1
wi. For each
losing coalition T inequality (6) is equivalent to
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q −M , which is true if we additionally
require q ≤M .
Sufficient conditions for proper games can be easily stated as
xS + xN−S ≤ 1 ∀S ⊆ N, |S| ≤ n/2. (8)
Similarly we have
xS + xN−S ≥ 1 ∀S ⊆ N, |S| ≤ n/2 (9)
for strong games. For constant-sum games we can take inequalities (8) and (9).
5.2. Power indices based on a counting function. Let Vn be a class of binary voting games on n
players. In the previous subsection we have provided ILP formulations for all types of binary voting
games described in Section 2 and remark that other classes require, expectably relatively easy and
standard, adaptations. For the power index we here assume that it is based on a counting function
C : Vn × 2N × N → Rn≥0. So we introduce the nonnegative real variables yi,S ∈ R≥0, with the
interpretation yi,S = Ci(v, S), for all i ∈ N , S ⊆ N and a game v ∈ Vn represented by the xS
and the constraints from Subsection 5.1. We model the induced power index P : Vn → Rn≥0 by the
variables pi ∈ R≥0 and the constraints
pi =
∑
S⊆N
yi,S (10)
for all i ∈ N . The constraints for the values yi,S = Ci(v, S) depend on the precise definition of
the respective counting function. For the power indices introduced in Section 3, which are based on
counting functions, they can easily be stated, since the underlying concepts of e.g. winning, losing,
minimal winning, or shift-minimal winning coalitions can be directly expressed using the binary
variables xS .
For the Shapley-Shubik index, given by the counting function
CSSIi (v, S) =
{
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n! : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S\{i}) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
and a subclass Vn ⊆ Sn of simple games we can state yi,S = (|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!n! ·
(
xS − xS\{i}
)
for all
{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N and yi,S = 0 for all S ⊆ N\{i}. If we cannot guarantee xS − xS\{i} ≥ 0, i.e. when
the game described by the xS is not simple, we have to model the first set of constraints differently:
yi,S ≤ (|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· xS ,
yi,S ≤ (|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· (1− xS\{i}) ,
yi,S ≥ (|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· (xS − xS\{i})
for all {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N . If either i /∈ S, v(S) = xS = 0, or v(S\{i}) = xS\{i} = 1, then we
clearly have yi,S = 0 due to yi,S ≥ 0. From the third set of the above inequalities we conclude
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yi,S =
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n! for the case where v(S) = xS = 1 and v(S\{i}) = xS\{i} = 0, since
yi,S ≤ (|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!n! · xS .
Generally, we remark that there is a rich modeling theory for ILPs and we want to briefly give a
few, in our context, relevant ideas. Let a ∈ {0, 1} be a variable representing a logical value. Assume
that we want to use a conditional inequality f(b) ≤ c just for the cases where a = 1 and drop it for
a = 0. Using a sufficiently large real constant M we can formulate this situation as
f(b) ≤ c+ (1− a) ·M.
This technique is called Big-M method and we have already seen its application in the case of weighted
games in the previous subsection. Since f(b) ≥ c is equivalent to −f(b) ≤ −c and f(b) = c is
equivalent to f(b) ≤ c and f(b) ≥ c, all types of conditional linear inequalities can be modeled. For
all logic operations, i.e. arbitrary combinations of and, or, and negation not of a finite number of
Boolean logical values, there exists a set of inequalities to model the corresponding logic gate.
In our example for the SSI, things become more smoothly if we additionally introduce the binary
variables y′i,S ∈ {0, 1} and set yi,S = (|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!n! · y′i,S .
We provide a list of ILP models for the power indices of Section 3, which are based on counting
functions, in appendix C. We have to remark that such ILP models can normally easily be obtained for
the absolute versions of the power indices. For the respective normalized versions we give a general
reduction to a sequence of ILPs in the next subsection. In some cases it is possible to reformulate,
to be more precisely to exactly linearize, a linear fractional term to several linear constraints, see e.g.
[55].
5.3. Measurement of the deviation. Suppose we are given a target vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) of the
desired power distribution. Given a certain power index P , a class of binary voting games Vn, and a
norm ‖·‖, the inverse power index problem asks for a game v ∈ Vn such that the deviation ‖P (v)−σ‖
from the desired power distribution is minimized. The details for the class of binary games and power
indices have been given in the previous subsections. Now we go into the details for the selectable
norms. When staying in the class of ILPs we have to, more or less, restrict ourselves onto the sum of
absolute values ‖ · ‖1 and the maximum norm ‖ · ‖∞.
Using more general optimization problems as a framework we can also write down other norms
easily or eventually solve the resulting problems with the corresponding optimization algorithms and
software packages. In this context ILPs are far more innocent than their generalization to MINLPs
(Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming).
In both treated cases we need the partial expression |pi − σi| for all i ∈ N . To this end we introduce
the nonnegative real variables δi and the inequalities
pi − σi ≤ δi and (11)
σi − pi ≤ δi (12)
for all i ∈ N . With this, all feasible solutions satisfy δi ≥ |pi − σi|. For the ‖ · ‖1 norm we can
minimize the target function
n∑
i=1
δi, (13)
so that we have δi = |pi − σi| for each minimal solution. For the ‖ · ‖∞ norm we can identify the δi,
i.e. set δ = δ1 = · · · = δn and minimize δ, so that we have δ = |pi − σi| for each minimal solution
and all i ∈ N .
Given that the three parts of an inverse power index problem can be expressed linearly with integer
(and real) variables, we can make use of one of the many available software packages for ILPs. For
our practical computations we have used the software CPLEX version 12.4 from IBM ILOG.
Once we can formulate a certain inverse power index problem with power index P , class Vn, and
norm ‖ · ‖ as an ILP, we can solve the corresponding problem with the normalized power index P̂
instead of P by a sequence of ILPs. Actually we have to express∣∣∣∣∣ pi∑nj=1 pj − σi
∣∣∣∣∣ = δi
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linearly (for all i ∈ N ). Since pi ≥ 0, we can multiply both sides with
∑n
j=1 pj and obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣pi − σi ·
n∑
j=1
pj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = δi ·
n∑
j=1
pj .
The absolute value on the left hand side can be easily linearized as show before. Unfortunately the
right hand side contains quadratic terms, i.e. the summands δi · pj depend on two variables. Since
none of the two variable types is binary, there is no standard linearization available. As a workaround
we introduce δ′i = δi ·
∑n
j=1 pj as new nonnegative real variables for all i ∈ N . With this, the
corresponding constraints are given by
pi − σi ·
n∑
j=1
pj ≤ δ′i and (14)
σi ·
n∑
j=1
pj − pi ≤ δ′i (15)
for all i ∈ N . Minimizing∑ni=1 δ′i (for ‖ · ‖1) or δ′ = δ′1 = · · · = δ′n (for ‖ · ‖∞) would not yield the
desired result. Instead we introduce a numerical parameter α and the constraint
t(δ′1, . . . , δ
′
n) ≤ α ·
n∑
j=1
pj , (16)
where t(δ1, . . . , δn) is the original target function. We completely drop the old target function and
obtain a so called feasibility problem, which can be solved with the same methods as ILPs including a
target function. The interpretation of α is as follows: If, for a given α, the corresponding ILP contains
a feasible solution, then there exists a solution of ‖P (v)− σ‖ ≤ α and each game v being described
by such a feasible solution satisfies this inequality. If otherwise the set of feasible solutions is empty,
we have ‖P (v)− σ‖ > α for all v ∈ Vn.
Initially we generally know that the minimum value of ‖P (v) − σ‖ is contained in the interval
[0,∞). Using a bisection algorithm for this interval and α, we obtain a sequence [l1, r1] ⊇ · · · ⊇
[lm, rm] of intervals of decreasing length such that the minimum value of ‖P (v) − σ‖ is contained
in [lj , rj ] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Thus we can determine the minimum possible deviation (and a cor-
responding game) up to each given precision. If Vn is finite there are only finitely many attainable
power distributions P (v), so that this convergence suffices to obtain the exact solution after a finite
number of iterations, i.e. there exists a problem-dependent upper bound on the length of [lm, rm]
which suffices to conclude that the best found solution is already optimal. For the Banzhaf index the
technical details have been described in [46] and, in more detail, in [48].
6. POWER DISTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE NOT CONCENTRATED ON THE FIRST k PLAYERS
Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Rn≥0 be a desired power vector with ‖σ‖1 = 1. Given a power index P ,
a norm ‖ · ‖, and a class Vn of binary games on n players, the inverse power index asks for a game
v ∈ Vn minimizing the deviation ‖P (v) − σ‖. In the previous section we have described an exact
integer linear programming approach for those power indices from Section 3, which are based on
counting functions. For a concrete instance of the inverse power index problem we may eventually
find the exact solution algorithmically in a reasonable amount of time.
Are more general statements achievable? If the number n of players is small, there is only a
relatively small finite number of games in Vn, so that minv∈Vn ‖P (v) − σ‖ may not become too
small. Whether minv∈Vn ‖P (v) − σ‖ is rather small or rather large can be decided by just looking
at the class of k-pure games in Vn with the aid of the Alon-Edelman type bounds from Section 4,
provided that most of the power of σ is concentrated on the first k coordinates, i.e.
∑
i=k+1 σi  1.
Despite this rather vague description, things can be made very precise by stating bounds in terms
on a parameter ε, with
∑
i=k+1 σi ≤ ε. Of course we cannot say much more, since there are power
distributions like e.g. σn = (0.75, 0.25, 0 . . . , 0) which are rather hard to approximate for most power
indices and others like σ′ = (0.5, 0.5, 0 . . . , 0), which can be perfectly met.
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Is the assumption that most of the power is concentrated on the first k components a realistic
assumption that is commonly satisfied in practice? Instead of an answer we aim to classify all vectors
of the unit simplex into different types of desired power distributions σ. To this end let us call
coordinates i, where σi is relatively small, oceanic. Those coordinates, where σi is relatively large,
are called islands. If we have a sequence σ(n) of desired power distributions with increasing number
of players for all n ∈ N, we can made this more precise immediately: We call coordinate i oceanic
iff limn→∞ σ
(n)
i = 0 and islands iff there exists a lower bound ui > 0 such that σ
(n)
i ≥ ui for all
sufficiently large n. In principle there may be coordinates which are neither oceanic nor islands, e.g.
we may have σ(n)i = 1/7 for odd n and σ
(n)
i =
1
n2
for even n. Those cases may be considered as not
well behaved and we ignore them, if not all coordinates are either oceanic or islands.
Now let k denote the number of islands of such a sequence. If the aggregated desired power of the
oceanic players is rather small or even tends to zero, we can apply the Alon-Edelman type results.
The two other cases are that we have no, i.e. k = 0, islands or the aggregated desired power of the
oceanic players is non-vanishing. For simplicity, we assume in the latter case that the desired power
of the ocean is roughly given by a real constant α. In both cases the so-called limit results for power
indices give precise theoretical predictions about the power distribution when considering weighted
games with weights wi equal to σi.
Let us first consider the case where no island is present, i.e. k = 0 or in other words, where
maxi σ
(n)
i tends to zero as n increases. The strongest statements are the so-called Penrose’s limit
(type) theorems, see [69]: Under certain technical conditions we have
lim
n→∞
Pi
([
q;σ
(n)
1 , . . . , σ
(n)
i , . . .
])
wi
= 1. (17)
Typical assumptions are that ‖σ(n)‖∞ tends to zero, and that the entries σ(n)i only take a finite number
of different values for each n and that the number of occurrences of each type increases with n – so-
called replicative chains of weighted games. For the Banzhaf index such a result was proven for
quota q = 12 and for the Shapley-Shubik index for all fixed quotas q ∈ (0, 1), see [56]. But there are
also cases where such a strong result does not hold, see e.g. [13, 57]. The technical assumption of
replicative chains can be dropped if relative convergence of the fractions in Equation (17) is replaced
by absolute convergence in e.g. the ‖ · ‖1-norm. [64, Theorem 9.8] states, in different notation
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥SSI(v(n))− σ(n)∥∥∥
1
= 0, (18)
where the weights of the weighted games v(n) can be taken as σ(n) and quota q can be taken almost
arbitrarily, i.e. there should be no cluster point at either 0 or 1. We remark that generally an absolute
limit result like Equation (18) implies a relative limit result like Equation (17) provided that replicative
chains are considered.
A big drawback of those limit results might be that they cannot be directly applied to a given single
desired power distribution σ. Whenever there are concrete error bounds we can say something for
a given single desired power distribution σ. Recently such a bound has been given in [49] for the
nucleolus:
‖Nuc([q;w])− w‖1 ≤
2 ·max1≤i≤nwi
min(q, 1− q) , (19)
for all q ∈ (0, 1) and w ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1. For the SSI such bounds should be hidden in the
proofs of the technical lemmas of [64].
In general we cannot expect much more than an inequality similar to (19): Let P be a symmetric,
efficient and positive power index satisfying the null player property. For σ(n) = 12n−1 · (2, . . . , 2, 1)
we have ∥∥∥P([q;σ(n)])− σ(n)∥∥∥
1
≥ 2
2n− 1 ·
n− 1
n
(20)
and maxi σ
(n)
i =
2
2n−1 for all n, see [48]. So for this special sequence of desired power distributions,
taking the desired power as weights yields a θ
(
1
n
)
-error, which is still considerably large for medium
sized constitutions like e.g. n = 27 or 28. For P = Bz we can remark that solving the inverse power
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index yields slightly better bounds than Inequality (20) within the class Tn and an exact solution
within the class of simple games for all 6 ≤ n ≤ 18, see [48, Table 9].
For the remaining case of a small but positive number of islands and a non-vanishing ocean there
are limit results too. In [73, Theorem 1] an approximation formula with an estimate for the rate of
convergence was given. Here the assumptions on the weight distribution within the ocean are rather
mild. Interestingly enough, provided a small variance of the weight distribution within the ocean the
error term is of the form θ
(
1
n
)
. If all oceanic players have the same weight, then there is a similar
result for the Banzhaf index, which fails to be true for asymmetric weight distributions within the
ocean, see [26]. Some first results in that direction for the nucleolus can be found in [36].
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Inspired by the seminal work of [1], we have considered Alon-Edelman type results for most of
the known power indices. It turned out that for the power indices KB, PHI, and Chow it makes no
sense to ask for Alon-Edelman type results, since the respective power indices do not admit power
distributions where most of the power is concentrated on a small number of players. For the other
considered power indices such a concentration is in principle possible. Nevertheless, there can be
no such result for the Johnston index, which we have shown by analytical power index calculations
for a certain class of parameterized weighted voting games, which might be interesting in its own
right. For p-binomial semivalues and k-rounding we similarly have obtained a negative result. On
the other hand we conjecture that there exists an Alon-Edelman type result for p-binomial semivalues
with (k, p)-rounding. The cases of the Shapley-Shubik index and more general semivalues are left
open. In order to classify and represent power indices in a unified way, we have introduced the
concept of power indices based on counting functions. Except the nucleolus and the MSR index,
due to somewhat global properties, all of the presented power indices of this paper, admit such a
representation. For those power indices based on counting functions, we have provided a theoretical
and notational framework to formulate Alon-Edelman type results, if they exist at all, in a unified and
more or less compact way.
We are pretty sure that some of our bounds for the quality functions in Table 1 can be improved.
It would also be interesting to construct worst case examples showing how far our estimates are from
the real truth. In order to study the existence question of Alon-Edelman type results for the nucleolus
or the MSR index possibly other techniques are necessary.
Maybe the concept of counting functions can be fruitfully used in different contexts in order to
unify approaches for several power indices. Examples might be generating function algorithms to
compute values of power indices for weighted voting games or the design of new, so far missed,
power indices, see [2].
Since k-rounding is the right shortening function for most power indices which admit an Alon-
Edelman type result, it would be interesting to study further of its theoretic properties. We have shown
that k-rounding preserves weightedness. What about the generalizations? Does k-rounding preserve
the dimension or stays within the class of roughly weighted, α-roughly weighted24, or homogeneous
games?
In the context of Alon-Edelman type results, of course one may find it interesting to enlarge the
class of binary voting games to games with several levels of approval in the input and output. If the
number of option tends to infinity we end up with continuous models, see e.g. [47]. Also the ‖ · ‖1 in
the present Alon-Edelman type results may be replaced by different norms.
Alon-Edelman type results allow negative approximation results by reducing the n player case
to the k player case, provided that the desired power is concentrated only on a few players. As a
counterpart we have outlined the known theory of limit results for power indices. For our purposes
it would be very valuable if some of these results could be turned into precise error estimates and
possibly generalized to larger classes of power indices.
From the practical point of view we have presented a general exact algorithmic approach for the
inverse power index problem for power indices based on counting functions using integer linear pro-
gramming. Any application of more sophisticated techniques from integer linear programming would
24See [32] and [37], where three hierarchies of simple games have been introduced.
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be beneficial to shift the computational limits of this approach, which generally is NP complete so
that exact solutions can be expected only for rather small numbers of players.
[1] close by mentioning that they began the study which vectors in the unit simplex can be closely
approximated by Banzhaf vectors of simple games. We generalize their question to the list of known
power indices and important subclasses of simple games. We agree that Alon-Edelman type results
seem to be unable to provide a complete solution. If power has to be attained for regions, i.e. collec-
tions of players, instead of single players, one can well approximate any distribution, as shown for
the special case of the Banzhaf index in [1, Proposition 3.1]. A similar statement is obviously true for
all symmetric, positive and efficient power indices, which satisfy the null player property.
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APPENDIX A. DETAILS FOR QUALITY FUNCTION RESULTS
In this section we want to prove the missing details for the quality function results announced
in Table 1. Since we have started with the proof for the Public Good Index, in Subsection 4.3, we
want to continue with the Deegan-Packel index, which arises as the equal division of the PGI, see
Definition 3.22.
We can exploit this relation by setting ĈDP =
∑n
i=k+1C
DP
i and denoting the number of minimal
winning coalitions that contain at least one member of (k, n] by M̂PGI. With this we have:
Lemma A.1.
M̂PGI ≤ ĈDP · (k + 1)
Proof. Let S be a minimal winning coalition that contains at least one player from (k, n]. We set
a := |S ∩ [1, k]| and b := |S ∩ (k, n]|, so that a + b = |S|, 0 ≤ a ≤ k, and 1 ≤ b ≤ n − k. Thus,
the stated inequality follows from
n∑
i=k+1
CDPi (v, S) =
b
a+b ≥ 1k+1 , where v denotes the respective
game. 
Corollary A.2. For the Deegan-Packel index we can choose f1(k) = (k+1)2 and f2(k) = (k+1)
2(k+5)
4 .
Doing a tailored analysis similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 4.23, allows us to provide tighter
bounds:
Lemma A.3. For the Deegan-Packel index we can choose f1(k) = k + 2 and f2(k) = k
2+6k+9
4 .
Proof. Let v = (W, [n]) be an arbitrary simple game. As defined before,CDPIi (v, 2[n]) is the counting
function of the Deegan-Packel index. For brevity, we just write Ci and C for CDPIi and C
DPI. As
further abbreviations we use v′ = (W ′, [n]) for the k-rounding of v and Ĉ = ∑ni=k+1Ci, i.e. the
restriction of C to the players in (k, n].
Now we want to study the changes in the Ci by going from v to v′. At first we consider the cases
where coalition S is a MWC in v but not in v′.
(1) If S ∩ (k, n] 6= ∅ then removing S from W results in a decrease of at least 1|S| for player i
and there is at least one player in (k, n]. Thus the negative change of the Ci of that type is
bounded by Ĉ.
(2) If S ⊆ [1, k], then S has to be winning in v′ too. Since S is not a MWC in v′ (by assumption),
there must be an index j ∈ S such that S − j is winning in v′. Thus there must be a coalition
∅ 6= T ∈ 2(k,n] such that S− j ∪T is a MWC in v. So we can bound those cases by counting
them at MWC S−j∪T . The contribution of S−j+T to Ĉ is tt+r ≥ 1r+1 , where t = |T | and
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r = |S− j|. Given coalition S− j+T , there are k− r ≤ k−1 possible choices for coalition
S. In each choice the decrease of Ci on S is given by 1r+1 so that the total decrease of Ci in
those cases is bound from above by (k − 1)Ĉ. For an upper bound of the decrease of all Ci
we have k − r possibilities involving r + 1 players each. Since (k − r)(r + 1) ≤
⌊
(k+1)2
4
⌋
,
we have the upper bound
⌊
(k+1)2
4
⌋
Ĉ.
Next, we consider the cases where coalition S is not a MWC in v but in v′. Since the players in (k, n]
are null players we can deduce S ∈ 2[1,k].
(3) Assume that S is losing in v but winning in v′. According to the rounding procedure there
exists a coalition ∅ 6= T ∈ 2(k,n] such that S ∪ T is a MWC in v. The contribution of S ∪ T
to Ĉ is tt+r ≥ 1r+1 , where t = |T | and r = |S|. Since Ci(S) = 1r in v and r ≥ 1 we have that
the total increase for Ci is bounded by 2Ĉ. For the sum over the Ci we note that the increase
is at most r · 1r = 1 for a single coalition compared to 1r+1 ≥ 1k+1 so that the overall change
of those cases is at most (k + 1)Ĉ.
(4) If S is winning in v, then there must be a player j ∈ S such that S − j is winning in v but
losing in v′. We proceed similarly as in case (2) and deduce an upper bound of kĈ for the
change of Ci and an upper bound of
⌊
(k+1)2
4
⌋
Ĉ for the sum of changes of the Ci.
Summarizing the four cases gives the mentioned two functions. 
Lemma A.4. Let v be a complete simple game with player setN and S ⊆ N a coalition. The number
of direct left-shifts of S is bounded by |S|+ 1 and ⌊n+12 ⌋.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we assume 1  2  · · ·  n. A direct left-shift of S arises either by shifting a player
of S one place to the left or by adding the weakest player n. For the other bound we observe that
player i can only be shifted to position i − 1 if i − 1 /∈ S and i 6= 1. Thus only ⌊n2 ⌋ players can
be shifted one position to the left, where equality is only possible if either n is odd or n is even and
n ∈ S. Considering the possible addition of player n given at most ⌊n+12 ⌋ cases. 
Lemma A.5. For the Shift index we can choose f1(k) = k+32 and f2(k) =
k2+3k+2
2 .
Proof. Let v = (W, [n]) be an arbitrary simple game. As defined before, CShifti (v, 2[n]) counts the
number of shift-minimal winning coalitions in v containing player i and we have CShift(v, 2[n]) =∑n
i=1C
Shift
i (v, 2
[n]). For brevity we just write Ci and C. As further abbreviations we use v′ =
(W ′, [n]) for the k-rounding of v, Ĉ = ∑ni=k+1Ci, i.e. the restriction of C to the players in (k, n],
and by M̂ we denote the number of shift-minimal winning coalitions in v that contain at least one
player from (k, n]. With this we have M̂ ≤ Ĉ.
Now we want to study the changes in the Ci by going from v to v′. At first we consider the cases
where coalition S is a SMWC (shift-minimal winning coalition) in v but not in v′.
(1) If S ∩ (k, n] 6= ∅ then removing S from v results in a decrease of 1 for player i and there is
at least one player in (k, n]. Thus the negative change of the Ci of that type is bounded by
M̂ ≤ Ĉ.
(2) If S ⊆ [1, k], then S has to be winning in v′ too. Since S is not a SMWC in v′ (by assump-
tion), there must be a direct right-shift S′ = S − j + h of S, where j ∈ S, h ∈ [1, k]\S
or h = ∅, such that S′ is winning in v′. According to the rounding procedure, there has to
be a subset ∅ 6= T ⊆ 2(k,n] such that S′ ∪ T is a SMWC in v. Given S′ there are at most
k+1
2 choices for S, see Lemma A.4. Thus, we have that the negative change is bounded by
k+1
2 · M̂ ≤ k+12 · Ĉ.
Next, we consider the cases where coalition S is not a SMWC in v but in v′. Since the players in
(k, n] are null players, we can deduce S ∈ 2[1,k].
(3) Assume that S is losing in v but winning in v′. According to the rounding procedure there
exists coalition ∅ 6= T ∈ 2(k,n] such that S ∪ T is a SMWC in v. Thus, the total increase for
Ci is bounded by M̂ ≤ Ĉ.
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(4) If S is winning in v, then there must be a direct right-shift S′ such that S′ is winning in v but
losing in v′. We proceed similarly as in case (2) and deduce an upper bound of k+12 · M̂ for
the change of Ci.
Summarizing the four cases gives the mentioned two functions. 
By proving the bound M̂Shift ≤ ĈSDP · (k + 1), similar to the proof of Lemma A.1, we can
conclude:
f1(k) =
k+3
2 and f2(k) =
k2+3k+2
2 .
Corollary A.6. For the Shift Deegan-Packel index we can choose f1(k) = (k+1)(k+3)2 and f2(k) =
(k+1)2(k+2)
2 .
But we can also perform a tailored analysis and improve the result a bit:
Lemma A.7. For the Shift Deegan-Packel index we can choose f1(k) = 2k + 1 and f2(k) = 2k2 +
k + 1.
Proof. Let v = (W, [n]) be an arbitrary simple game. As defined before, CSDPi (v, 2[n]) is the count-
ing function of the Shift Deegan-Packel index. For brevity we just write Ci and C for CSDPi and
C
SDP. As further abbreviations we use v′ = (W ′, [n]) for the k-rounding of v and Ĉ = ∑ni=k+1Ci,
i.e. the restriction of C to the players in (k, n].
Now we want to study the changes in the Ci by going from v to v′. At first we consider the cases
where coalition S is a SMWC in v but not in v′.
(1) If S ∩ (k, n] 6= ∅ then removing S fromW results in a decrease of 1|S| for player i and there
is at least one player in (k, n]. Thus the negative change of the Ci of that type is bounded by
Ĉ.
(2) If S ⊆ [1, k], then S has to be winning in v′ too. Since S is not a SMWC in v′ (by assump-
tion), there must be a direct right-shift S′ = S − j + h of S, where j ∈ S, h ∈ [1, k]\S or
h = ∅, such that S′ is winning in v′. According to the rounding procedure there has to be a
subset ∅ 6= T ⊆ 2(k,n] such that S′ ∪ T is a SMWC in v. Let u := |S′| and v := |T |. Since
v
u+v ≥ 1u+1 the loss of the small ones is at least 1u+1 . Since u ≤ |S| ≤ u + 1 the decrease
can be bounded by 2kĈ.
Next, we consider the cases where coalition S is not a SMWC in v but in v′. Since the players in
(k, n] are null players we can deduce S ∈ 2[1,k].
(3) Assume that S is losing in v but winning in v′. According to the rounding procedure, there
exists coalition ∅ 6= T ∈ 2(k,n] such that S ∪ T is a SMWC in v. Thus, the total increase for
Ci is bounded by Ĉ.
(4) If S is winning in v, then there must be a direct right-shift S′ such that S′ is winning in vG
but losing in v′. We proceed similarly as in case (2) and deduce an upper bound of 2kĈ for
the change of Ci.
Summarizing the four cases gives the mentioned two functions. 
Lemma A.8. For the Tijs index (and k-up-rounding) we can choose f1(k) = 0 and f2(k) = 1.
Proof. Let v denote the original game and v′ the k-up-rounding of v for an integer 0 < k < n. By
m1 we denote the number of vetoers in [1, k] and by m2 the number of vetoers in (k, n] of v. k-up-
rounding maps winning coalitions to winning coalitions. A coalition S is winning in v′ iff S ∩ [1, k]
is winning in v′ and S′ ⊆ [1, k] is winning in v′ iff there exists a subset T ⊆ (k, n] such that S′ ∪T is
winning in v. Thus a player i ∈ [1, k] is a vetoer in v if she is a vetoer in v′ and no player j ∈ (k, n] can
be a vetoer in v′. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have CTijsi (Γ(v) , 2N ) = CTijsi
(
v, 2N
)
, so that we can choose
f1(k) = 0, where Γ denotes k-up-rounding. Since we have C
Tijs(
Γ(v), 2N
)
= C
Tijs(
v, 2N
)
= m2,
we can choose f1(k) = 1. 
Lemma A.9. For ColPrev we can choose f1(k) = 2 and f2(k) = 2k + 1.
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Proof. Let us write ηi(v, 2N ) = C
swing
i (v, 2
N ) for the number of swings for player i and η(v, 2N ) =
C
swing
(v, 2N ). By v′ we denote Γ(v), where Γ is the k-rounding function. From Lemma 4.15 and
Lemma 4.12 we conclude ∣∣ηi(v′, 2N )− ηi(v, 2N )∣∣ ≤ ε · η(v, 2N ) (21)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By W(v) and W(v′) we denote the set of winning coalitions of v and v′,
respectively. From the proof of Lemma 4.15 we obtain∣∣∣|W(v′)| − |W(v)|∣∣∣ ≤ ε · η(v, 2N ). (22)
With this we conclude∣∣∣∣ηi(v′, 2N )|W(v′)| − ηi(v, 2N )|W(v)|
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ηi(v′, 2N )|W(v)| − ηi(v, 2N )|W(v)|
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ηi(v′, 2N )|W(v′)| − ηi(v′, 2N )|W(v)|
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣ηi(v′, 2N )− ηi(v, 2N )∣∣
|W(v)| +
ηi(v
′, 2N )
|W(v′)| ·
∣∣∣|W(v′)| − |W(v)|∣∣∣
|W(v)|
≤ ε · η(v, 2
N )
|W(v)| +
ηi(v
′, 2N )
|W(v′)| ·
ε · η(v, 2N )
|W(v)|
≤ 2 · ε · η(v, 2
N )
|W(v)|
where we have used the triangle inequality, Inequality (21), Inequality (22), and the fact that the
number of swings for player i cannot be larger then the number of winning coalitions. Thus we can
choose f1(k) = 2. Due to Lemma 4.13 we can choose f2(k) = k · f1(k) + 1 = 2k + 1. 
Lemma A.10. For ColIni we can choose f1(k) = 2 and f2(k) = 2k + 1.
Proof. As pointed out in e.g. [25] ColIni(v) equals ColPrev(v?), where v? denotes the dual game of
v, see e.g. [77] for a definition. Since the class of simple games is closed under taking the dual and
ĈolIni = ĈolPrev, we can chose the same quality functions as in Lemma A.9. 
While we have obtained a negative Alon-Edelman-type result for p-binomial semivalues, there are
subclasses of semivalues where we can easily conclude a positive Alon-Edelman-type result from the
proof of Lemma 4.15:
Lemma A.11. Let ΨP be a semivalue such that there exist real constants c1, c2 ∈ R>0 such that
c1 ≤ Pi ≤ c2 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Then, we can choose f1(k) = c2c1 and f2(k) = c2c1 · (k + 1).
We remark that the above lemma is also valid for the more general probabilistic values if c1 ≤
PS ≤ c2 holds for all S ⊆ N .
APPENDIX B. DETAILS FOR A CLASS OF PARAMETERIZED WEIGHTED GAMES
In this section we provide the delayed proofs from Subsection 4.4. Before going into the details
for p-binomial semivalues and the (absolute) Johnston index, we provide a useful bound for binomial
coefficients:
Lemma B.1. For integers 1 ≤ m ≤ n we have (n−1m−1) ≤ 2n−1√n .
Proof. Since the binomial coefficients attain their maximum at the center, it suffices to prove the
proposed inequality for m− 1 = ⌊n−12 ⌋. For t ≥ 1 we have (2tt ) ≤ 22t√3t+1 . From (2t−1t−1 )+ (2t−1t ) =(
2t
t
)
and
(
2t−1
t−1
)
=
(
2t−1
t
)
, we conclude
(
2t−1
t−1
) ≤ 22t−1√
3t+1
for all t ≥ 1. Thus, we have (n−1m−1) ≤ 2n−1√n
for all n ≥ 1. 
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B.1. Technical details for p-binomial semivalues. We start our considerations with three technical
estimates which will be used in the subsequent lemmas. The common theoretical basis of the first two
estimates is Hoeffding’s inequality, which provides an upper bound on the probability that the sum of
random variables deviates from its expected value.
Lemma B.2. If m =
⌈
n+1
2
⌉
and p = 12 + δ, where
1
2 > δ > 0, then
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ≥ 1− exp(−2nδ2).
Proof. Since
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1 − p)n−j = 1, it suffices to prove
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1 − p)n−j ≤ exp(−2nδ2).
To this end, we apply Hoeffding’s inequality for the special case of Bernoulli random variables and
deduce
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ≤ exp
(
−2(np− (m− 1))
2
n
)
≤ exp
(
−2(nδ)
2
n
)
= exp(−2nδ2).

Lemma B.3. If m =
⌊
n
2
⌋
and p = 12 − δ, where 12 > δ > 0, then
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ≥ 1− exp(−2nδ2 + 2δ).
Proof. Since
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j =
n∑
j=n−m+1
(
n
j
)
(1− p)jpn−j , we can similarly proceed as in the
proof of Lemma B.2 and prove
n−m∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(1 − p)jpn−j ≤ exp(−2nδ2 + 2δ). To this end, we apply
Hoeffding’s inequality for the special case of Bernoulli random variables and deduce
n−m∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ≤ exp
(
−2(n(1− p)− (n−m))
2
n
)
≤ exp
(
−2(nδ −
1
2)
2
n
)
≤ exp(−2nδ2 + 2δ).

Lemma B.4. If m ∈ { ⌈n+12 ⌉ , ⌊n2 ⌋ } and p = 12 + δ or p = 12 − δ, where 0 ≤ δ < 12 , then
pm−1(1− p)n−m ≤ 4 · (1− 4δ
2)(n−3)/2
2n−1
.
Proof. We have
pm−1(1− p)n−m = (1± 2δ)
m−1 · (1∓ 2δ)n−m
2n−1
≤ (1− 2δ)
(n−3)/2 · (1 + 2δ)(n+1)/2
2n−1
,
where the right hand side is bounded by 4 · (1−4δ2)(n−3)/2
2n−1 due to δ <
1
2 . 
Next we go on and determine formulas for the p-binomial semivalue Ψp for the three games vk,ln,m,
vk,ln,n+1, and v
k,l
n,0 and the three types of players:
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Lemma B.5. For p ∈ (0, 1) and integers l, k,m, n satisfying the restrictions from Definition 4.24
and 1 ≤ m ≤ n, we have
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,m) =
(
k − 1
l − 1
)
· pl−1 · (1− p)k−l
+1 · pl(1− p)k−l−1 ·
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
· pj(1− p)n−j ∀i ∈ [1, k − l]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,m) =
((
k − 1
l − 1
)
− 1
)
· pl−1 · (1− p)k−l
+1 · pl−1(1− p)k−l ·
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
· pj(1− p)n−j ∀i ∈ (k − l, k]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,m) = 1 · pl(1− p)k−l ·
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· pm−1(1− p)n−m ∀i ∈ (k, k + n]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,n+1) =
(
k − 1
l − 1
)
· pl−1 · (1− p)k−l + 1 · pl(1− p)k−l−1 ∀i ∈ [1, k − l]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,n+1) =
((
k − 1
l − 1
)
− 1
)
· pl−1 · (1− p)k−l ∀i ∈ (k − l, k]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,n+1) = 0 ∀i ∈ (k, k + n]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,0) =
(
k − 1
l − 1
)
· pl−1 · (1− p)k−l ∀i ∈ [1, k − l]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,0) =
(
k − 1
l − 1
)
· pl−1 · (1− p)k−l ∀i ∈ (k − l, k]
Ψpi (v
k,l
n,0) = 0 ∀i ∈ (k, k + n]
Proof. We note that the i-swings of vk,ln,m, v
k,l
n,n+1, and v
k,l
n,0 all are of one of the forms U ⊆ [k] with
|U | = l − 1 and T ∪ V with V ⊆ (k, k + n]. 
Now we are interested in the differences Ψp(vk,ln,m) − Ψp(vk,ln,n+1) and Ψp(vk,ln,m) − Ψp(vk,ln,0). In-
serting into the terms of Definition 4.27 yields:
Lemma B.6. For p ∈ (0, 1), P = Ψp, and integers l, k,m, n satisfying the restrictions from Defini-
tion 4.24 and 1 ≤ m ≤ n, we have
∆1,P1,2 = p
l(1− p)k−l−1 ·
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ,
∆2,P1,2 = p
l−1(1− p)k−l ·
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ,
∆3,P1,2 = 1 · pl(1− p)k−l ·
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· pm−1(1− p)n−m,
∆1,P1,3 = p
l(1− p)k−l−1 ·
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ,
∆2,P1,3 = p
l−1(1− p)k−l ·
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j ,
∆3,P1,3 = 1 · pl(1− p)k−l ·
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· pm−1(1− p)n−m, and
ξP = n∆3,P1,2 = n∆
3,P
1,3 = n · pl(1− p)k−l ·
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· pm−1(1− p)n−m.
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Proof. (of Lemma 4.28)
(1) We set p = 12 + δ, where
1
2 > δ > 0, and conclude
∆1,P1,2
ξP
=
n∑
j=m
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j
n(1− p) · (n−1m−1) · pm−1(1− p)n−m ≥ 1n(1− p) · 1− exp(−2nδ
2)
2n−1√
n
· 4 (1−4δ2)(n−3)/2
2n−1
using Lemma B.2, Lemma B.1, and Lemma B.4. The last expression can be rewritten to
1
4(1− p) ·
1− exp(−2nδ2)√
n(1− 4δ2)(n−3)/2 ,
which clearly tends to∞ as n increases. Since ∆2,P1,2 = ∆1,P1,2 · 1−pp , we can also deduce the
second statement.
(2) Similarly, we set p = 12 − δ, where 12 > δ > 0, and conclude
∆1,P1,3
ξP
=
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
pj(1− p)n−j
n(1− p) · (n−1m−1) · pm−1(1− p)n−m ≥ 1n(1− p) · 1− exp(−2nδ
2 + 2δ)
2n−1√
n
· 4 (1−4δ2)(n−3)/2
2n−1
using Lemma B.3, Lemma B.1, and Lemma B.4. The last expression can be rewritten to
1
4(1− p) ·
1− exp(−2nδ2 + 2δ)√
n(1− 4δ2)(n−3)/2 ,
which clearly tends to∞ as n increases. Since ∆2,P1,3 = ∆1,P1,3 · 1−pp , we can also deduce the
second statement.
(3) From Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.4 we conclude
ξP ≤ n ·
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· pm−1(1− p)n−m ≤ 4√n · (1− 4δ2)(n−3)/2,
where the right hand side clearly tends to zero as n increases.

Proof. (of Lemma 4.29) For i ∈ [1, k − l] we have∣∣∣Ψpi (vk,ln,m)−Ψpi (vk,ln,n+1)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Ψpi (vk,ln,m)−Ψpi (vk,ln,0)∣∣∣ ≤ pl(1− p)k−l−1 ≤ pl−1(1− p)k−l−1
and for i ∈ (k − k, k] we have∣∣∣Ψpi (vk,ln,m)−Ψpi (vk,ln,n+1)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Ψpi (vk,ln,m)−Ψpi (vk,ln,0)∣∣∣ ≤ pl−1(1− p)k−l ≤ pl−1(1− p)k−l−1.
Since we have defined 1n · ξP as∣∣∣Ψpi (vk,ln,m)−Ψpi (vk,ln,n+1)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Ψpi (vk,ln,m)−Ψpi (vk,ln,0)∣∣∣ ,
where i ∈ (k, k+n], applying the triangle inequality for the absolute values gives the stated inequality.

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B.2. Technical details for the (absolute) Johnston index.
Lemma B.7. For l = 1 and integers k,m, n satisfying the restrictions from Definition 4.24 and
1 ≤ m ≤ n, we have
JSi(v
k,l
n,m) =
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
· 1 +
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
· 1 = 2n +
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
∀i ∈ [1, k)
JSk(v
k,l
n,m) =
n∑
j=m+1
(
n
j
)
· 1 +
(
n
m
)
· 1
m+ 1
JSi(v
k,l
n,m) =
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· 1
m+ 1
∀i ∈ (k, k + n]
JSi(v
k,l
n,n+1) =
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
· 1 = 2n ∀i ∈ [1, k]
JSi(v
k,l
n,n+1) = 0 ∀i ∈ (k, k + n]
JSi(v
k,l
n,0) =
n+1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
· 1 = 2n+1 ∀i ∈ [1, k)
JSi(v
k,l
n,0) = 0 ∀i ∈ [k, k + n]
ξJS = n ·
(
n− 1
m− 1
)
· 1
m+ 1
.
Proof. We note that all swing coalitions are of the form {i} ∪ T , {i, k} ∪ T , and {k} ∪ T , where
1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and ∅ ⊆ T ⊆ (k, n+ k]. 
Proof. (of Lemma 4.33) From Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.7 we conclude
JSi(v
k,l
n,m) = 3 · 4n˜ ∀i ∈ [1, k)
JSk(v
k,l
n,m) ≥ 4n˜ −
√
2 · 4n˜√
n˜+ 1
JSk(v
k,l
n,m) ≤ 4n˜
ξJS ≤
√
2 · 4n˜√
n˜
.
For n˜ ≥ 1 we then have
‖ JS(vk,ln,m)− JS(vk,ln,n+1)‖1 ≥ k · 4n˜ + ξJS ≥
(
k ·
√
n˜√
2
+ 1
)
ξJS,
‖ JS(vk,ln,m)− JS(vk,ln,0)‖1 ≥ k · 4n˜ −
√
2 · 4n˜√
n˜+ 1
+ ξJS ≥ (k − 1)4n˜ + ξJS
≥
(
(k − 1) ·
√
n˜√
2
+ 1
)
ξJS, and
lim
n˜→∞
ξJS
n+k∑
i=1
JSi(v
k,l
n,m)
= 0.

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Proof. (of Lemma 4.35) Summing up the inequalities from Lemma 4.33 yields
(3k − 2) · 4n˜ −
√
2 · 4n˜√
n˜
≤
k+n∑
i=1
JSi(v
k,l
n,m) ≤ (3k − 2) · 4n˜ +
√
2 · 4n˜√
n˜
,
k+n∑
i=1
JSi(v
k,l
n,n+1) = (2k) · 4n˜, and
k+n∑
i=1
JSi(v
k,l
n,0) = (4k − 4) · 4n˜.
For i ∈ [1, k) we have∣∣∣∣∣ JSi(vk,ln,m)∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,m)
− JSi(v
k,l
n,n+1)∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,n+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 3 · 4
n˜
(3k − 2) · 4n˜ +
√
2·4n˜√
n˜
− 2 · 4
n˜
2k · 4n˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where the right hand side can be lower bounded by 15k(k−1) for sufficiently large n˜, so that
n+k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣ JSi(vk,ln,m∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,m)
− JSi(v
k,l
n,n+1)∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,n+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 15k .
Similarly we deduce
n+k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣ JSi(vk,ln,m)∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,m)
− JSi(v
k,l
n,0)∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,0)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 15k .
Finally, we conclude
ξJs∑n+k
j=1 JSj(v
k,l
n,m)
≤
√
2
(3k − 3)√n˜
for n˜ ≥ 2. 
APPENDIX C. ILP FORMULATIONS FOR THE COUNTING FUNCTIONS OF ALMOST ALL POWER
INDICES FROM SECTION 3
In Subsection 5.2 we have described the general idea of modeling power indices in the framework
of integer linear programming. Our approach is based on the idea of a counting function. Since we
can treat the normalized version of a power index, whenever we can treat the original version, see
Subsection 5.3 for the algorithmic details, we restrict ourselves25 on presenting ILP formulations for
the absolute versions of the power indices introduced in Section 3. In the following subsections we
will state sufficient constraints for each power index separately. Those constraints for yi,S have to be
required for all i ∈ N , which we will not repeat at each place.
C.1. SSI.
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (23)
yi,S ≤ (|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (24)
yi,S ≤ (|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· (1− xS\{i}) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N and (25)
yi,S ≥ (|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· (xS − xS\{i}) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. (26)
For subclasses of simple games this simplifies to
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i} and (27)
yi,S =
(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
· (xS − xS\{i}) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. (28)
25Exact linearization techniques for fractional linear terms can e.g. be found in [55]. See also the approach described in
Subsection C.7.
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C.2. Tijs. As an incidence vector for minimal winning coalitions we introduce binary variables zmS ∈
{0, 1} for all S ⊆ N . The constraints
zmS ≤ xS ∀S ⊆ N, (29)
zmS ≤ 1− xS\{j} ∀S ⊆ N, j ∈ S, and (30)
zmS ≥ xS −
∑
j∈S
xS\{j} ∀S ⊆ N (31)
guarantee that zmS = 1 if and only if S is a minimal winning coalition. Next we introduce m ∈ {0, 1}
with the interpretation that m = 1 if and only if |Wm| = 1. This can be enforced by
m ≤
∑
S⊆N
zmS , (32)
m ≥ zmS −
∑
T⊆N,T 6=S
zmT ∀S ⊆ N, and (33)∑
S⊆N
zmS ≤ 1 + (1−m) · (2n − 1) . (34)
With this we can complete the ILP formulation by
yi,S ≤ zmS , (35)
yi,S ≤ m, and (36)
yi,S ≥ zmS +m− 1 (37)
for all S ⊆ N .
C.3. Semivalues Ψp. As the Shapley-Shubik index is a special semivalue we might state an ILP
formulation similar to those in Subsection C.1. In order to better highlight the underlying concept we
introduce binary variables zsi,S ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N . The constraints
zsi,S ≤ xS ∀S ⊆ N, (38)
zsi,S ≤ 1− xS\{i} ∀S ⊆ N, and (39)
zsi,S ≥ xS − xS\{i} ∀S ⊆ N (40)
guarantee that zsi,S = 1 if and only if i ∈ S and S\{i} is a swing coalition for i. For subclasses of
simple games this simplifies to
zsi,S = xS − xS\{i} ∀S ⊆ N. (41)
With this we can set yi,S = p|S|−1 · zsi,S .
C.4. Binomial semivalues Ψp. Using the notation from Subsection C.3 we set yi,S = p|S|−1(1 −
p)n−|S| · zsi,S .
C.5. Bz. Using the notation from Subsection C.3 we set yi,S = 1/2n−1 · zsi,S .
C.6. swing. Using the notation from Subsection C.3 we set yi,S = zsi,S .
C.7. ColPrev. We use the notation from Subsection C.3. Things would be very easy if we could
write yi,S = 1|W| · zsi,S , but unfortunately even 1|W| is nonlinear, since |W| =
∑
S⊆N xS . Introducing
the nonnegative real variables aS ∈ R≥0 for all S ⊆ N , we can model the distribution of 1|W| to each
winning coalition as follows:
aS ≤ xS ∀S ⊆ N, (42)
aS − aT ≥ xS + xT − 2 ∀S, T ⊆ N, and (43)∑
S⊆N
aS = 1. (44)
By Inequality (42) we have aS = 0 for all losing coalitions and aS ≤ 1 for all winning coalitions.
So especially we have 0 ≤ aS ≤ 1 for all S ⊆ N . Thus aS − aT ≥ −1 for all S, T ⊆ N , so
that Inequality (43) is only a restriction if both coalitions S and T are winning. In this case we have
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aS−aT ≥ 0 and due to the symmetric formulation also aT −aS ≥ 0, so that we finally have aS = aT
(Here we also have applied the Big-M method withM = 1.). With Equation (44) we obtain aS = 1|W|
for all winning coalitions S. It remains to assign the value 1|W| only to swing coalitions instead of
winning coalitions:
yi,S ≤ zsi,S , (45)
yi,S ≥ aS −
(
1− zsi,S
)
, and (46)
yi,S ≤ aS + (1− xS) (47)
for all S ⊆ N . If either i /∈ S or S\{i} is not a swing coalition for player i, then Inequality (45)
ensures yi,S = 0 due to yi,S ≥ 0. Otherwise we have zsi,S = xS = 1, so that inequalities (46) and (47)
are equivalent to yi,S ≥ aS and yi,S ≤ aS , respectively. Thus we have yi,S = 1|W| as requested. For
either zsi,S = 0 or xS = 0 inequalities (46) and (47) are satisfied automatically due to 0 ≤ aS ≤ 1.
C.8. ColIni. We similarly proceed as in Subsection C.7 and introduce the nonnegative real variables
aS ∈ R≥0, for all S ⊆ N . With this we can model the distribution of 1|L| to each losing coalition as
follows:
aS ≤ 1− xS ∀S ⊆ N, (48)
aS − aT ≥ −xS − xT ∀S, T ⊆ N, and (49)∑
S⊆N
aS = 1. (50)
It remains to assign the value 1|L| only to swing coalitions instead of losing coalitions:
yi,S = 0 ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (51)
yi,S ≤ 1− xS ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (52)
yi,S ≤ xS∪{i} ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (53)
yi,S ≥ aS −
(
xS + 1− xS∪{i}
) ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, and (54)
yi,S ≤ aS +
(
xS + 1− xS∪{i}
) ∀S ⊆ N\{i}. (55)
C.9. Rae.
yi,S =
1
2|N |
· xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N and (56)
yi,S =
1
2|N |
· (1− xS) ∀S ⊆ N\{i}. (57)
C.10. KB. Using the notation from Subsection C.7 we can state
yi,S = aS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N and (58)
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}. (59)
C.11. PHI. Similarly as in Subsection C.7 we obtain:
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (60)
yi,S ≤ xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (61)
yi,S ≥ aS − (1− xS) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (62)
yi,S ≤ aS + (1− xS) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (63)
aS ≤ xS ∀S ⊆ N, (64)
aS − aT ≥ xS + xT − 2 ∀S, T ⊆ N, and (65)∑
S⊆N
|S| · aS = 1. (66)
C.12. Chow.
yi,S = xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N and (67)
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}. (68)
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C.13. JS. With the notation from Subsection C.3 we can state:
yi,S ≤ zsi,S ∀S ⊆ N, (69)
yi,S − yj,S ≥ zsi,S + zsj,S − 2 ∀i, j ∈ N,S ⊆ N, (70)
n∑
i=1
yi,S ≤ 1 ∀S ⊆ N, (71)
n∑
i=1
yi,S ≤
n∑
i=1
zsi,S ∀S ⊆ N, and (72)
n∑
j=1
yj,S ≥ zsi,S ∀S ⊆ N, i ∈ N. (73)
C.14. PGI.
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (74)
yi,S ≤ xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (75)
yi,S ≤ 1− xS\{j} ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, j ∈ S, and (76)
yi,S ≥ xS −
∑
j∈S
xS\{j} ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. (77)
C.15. DP.
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (78)
yi,S ≤ 1|S| · xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (79)
yi,S ≤ 1|S| ·
(
1− xS\{j}
) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, j ∈ S, and (80)
yi,S ≥ 1|S| ·
xS −∑
j∈S
xS\{j}
 ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. (81)
C.16. Shift.
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (82)
yi,S ≤ xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (83)
yi,S ≤ 1− xT ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N,T direct right-shift of S, and (84)
yi,S ≥ xS −
∑
T direct right-shift of S
xT ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. (85)
C.17. SDP.
yi,S = 0 ∀S ⊆ N\{i}, (86)
yi,S ≤ 1|S| · xS ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N, (87)
yi,S ≤ 1|S| · (1− xT ) ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N,T direct right-shift of S, and(88)
yi,S ≥ 1|S| ·
xS − ∑
T direct right-shift of S
xT
 ∀{i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. (89)
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APPENDIX D. COUNTING FUNCTIONS FOR ALMOST ALL POWER INDICES FROM SECTION 3
CSSIi (v, S) =
{
(|S|−1)!(n−|S|)!
n! : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
CTijsi (v, S) =
{
1 : S ∈ Wmi , |Wm| = 1,
0 : otherwise,
CΨ
p
i (v, S) =
{
p|S|−1 : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
CΨ
p
i (v, S) =
{
p|S|−1(1− p)n−|S| : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
CBzi (v, S) =
{
1/2n−1 : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
Cswingi (v, S) =
{
1 : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
CColPrevi (v, S) =
{ 1
|W| : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
CColInii (v, S) =
{ 1
|L| : i /∈ S, v(S) = 0, v(S + i) = 1,
0 : otherwise,
CRaei (v, S) =
{
1
2|N| : i ∈ S ∈ W or i /∈ S /∈ W,
0 : otherwise,
CKBi (v, S) =
{ 1
|W| : S ∈ Wi,
0 : otherwise,
CPHIi (v, S) =
{
1∑n
j=1 |Wj | : S ∈ Wi,
0 : otherwise,
CChowi (v, S) =
{
1 : S ∈ Wi,
0 : otherwise,
CJSi (v, S) =
{ 1
|{j∈S : v(S−j)=0}| : i ∈ S, v(S) = 1, v(S − i) = 0,
0 : otherwise,
CPGIi (v, S) =
{
1 : S ∈ Wmi ,
0 : otherwise,
CDPi (v, S) =
{ 1
|S| : S ∈ Wmi ,
0 : otherwise,
CShifti (v, S) =
{
1 : S ∈ Wsmi ,
0 : otherwise,
CSDPi (v, S) =
{ 1
|S| : S ∈ Wsmi ,
0 : otherwise.
APPENDIX E. PROPERTIES OF POWER INDICES
In Section 3 we have introduced several properties of power indices. Whether a certain power
index satisfies such a property depends on the class of games where he is applied to. Here we want
to restrict ourselves onto the class of simple games and summarize the results in Table 2. Some of
the stated entries can be e.g. found in [6], are folklore, or can be easily proven. Since all mentioned
power indices P are positive, we can apply Lemma 3.4 and deduce that the respective normalized
power index P̂ is efficient.
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power index symmetric positive efficient null player propertynull player removable
SSI     
Tijs  - -  
Ψp   -  
Ψp   -  
Bz   -  
swing   -  -
ColPrev   -  
ColIni   -  
Rae   - - 
KB   - - 
PHI    - -
Chow   - - -
JS   -  -
PGI   -  
DP   -  
Shift   -  
SDP   -  
Nuc     
MSR     
Colomer   - - -
TABLE 2. Properties of power indices on simple games
APPENDIX F. RECURSION FORMULAS FOR POWER INDICES
Given the player set N , simple games are uniquely characterized by their setW of winning coali-
tions. With the inclusion operation for the sets of winning coalitions, simple games with player set
N become a poset and even a graded poset using the rank function |W|, i.e. the number of winning
coalitions. Starting from the simple game v, where all non-empty subsets are winning, we can reach
each simple game by recursively turning a minimal winning coalition into a losing coalition. We can
use this recursion for the computation of power indices of simple games. For each symmetric and
efficient power index P we have P (v) = 1n · (1, . . . , 1). For other power indices the value P (v) can
usually be obtained easily. It remains to provide a recursive formula for a given power index for the
case that one minimal winning coalition is turned into a losing coalition. For the swing count such a
recursive formula is e.g. given in [29, Lemma 3.3.12]:
Lemma F.1. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
ηi(v
′) =
{
ηi(v)− 1 : i ∈ T,
ηi(v) + 1 : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N .
Since BZi(v) =
ηi(v)
2n−1 we obtain:
Lemma F.2. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
BZi(v
′) =
{
BZi(v)− 12n−1 : i ∈ T,
BZi(v) +
1
2n−1 : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N .
From Raei(v) = 12 +
1
2 · BZi(v) we conclude:
Lemma F.3. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
Raei(v
′) =
{
Raei(v)− 12n : i ∈ T,
Raei(v) +
1
2n : i ∈ N\T
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for all i ∈ N .
Also the Shapley-Shubik index counts swings in a weighted form, so that:
Lemma F.4. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
SSIi(v
′) =
{
SSIi(v)− (|T |−1)!·(|N |−|T |)!|N |! : i ∈ T,
SSIi(v) +
|T |!·(|N |−1−|T |)!
|N |! : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N .
More generally for p-binomial semivalues we have:
Lemma F.5. Let p ∈ (0, 1) and v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal
winning coalitions. Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
Ψpi (v
′) =
{
Ψpi (v)− pt−1(1− p)n−t : i ∈ T,
Ψpi (v) + p
t(1− p)n−t−1 : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N , where t = |T | and n = |N |.
We remark that the increments and the decrements differ by a factor of p1−p (or
1−p
p ). If only
winning coalitions are counted, then only the value of the players in T are changed:
Lemma F.6. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
Chowi(v
′) =
{
Chowi(v)− 1 : i ∈ T,
Chowi(v) : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N .
For the Ko¨nig-Bra¨uninger index and the Coleman power of a member to prevent action we have to
consider a reweighting of the values based on the change of the number of winning coalitions:
Lemma F.7. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
KBi(v
′) =
{ |W|
|W|−1 ·KBi(v)− 1|W|−1 : i ∈ T,
|W|
|W|−1 ·KBi(v) : i ∈ N\T
and
ColPrevi(v
′) =
{ |W|
|W|−1 · ColPrevi(v)− 1|W|−1 : i ∈ T,
|W|
|W|−1 · ColPrevi(v) + 1|W|−1 : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N .
Lemma F.8. Let v = (W, N) be a simple game and T 6= N be one of its minimal winning coalitions.
Turning T into a losing coalition gives a simple game v′ with
JSi(v
′) =
{
JSi(v)− 1|T | : i ∈ T,
JSi(v) +
1
|T |+1 : i ∈ N\T
for all i ∈ N .
For PGI, DP, Shift, and SDP it may be a non-trivial task to write down similar recursion formulas.
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APPENDIX G. TECHNICAL DETAILS FOR SHAPLEY-SHUBIK INDEX
For the parametric class of weighted games vk,ln,m, defined in Subsection 4.4, and its possible k-
roundings vk,ln,n+1 and v
k,l
n,0, we want to deduce an explicit formula for the computation of the Shapley
Shubik index for each player type.
For vk,ln,0 the first k players are symmetric and the other players are null players, so that we obtain
SSI(vk,ln,0) =
(
1
k
, . . . ,
1
k
,
1
k
, . . . ,
1
k
, 0, . . . , 0
)
.
For vk,ln,n+1 and a player i ∈ [1, k − l] the i-swings are given by the coalitions U ∪ V , where U ⊆
[1, k] − i with |U | = l − 1, V ⊆ (k, k + n], and T ∪ V , where V ⊆ (k, k + n]. Thus we obtain for
the corresponding value of the SSI:
1
(n+ k)!
·
( ∑
V⊆(k,k+n]
( ∑
U⊆[1,k]−i
|U |=l−1
|U ∪ V |! · (n+ k − |U ∪ V | − 1)!
+ |T ∪ V |! · (n+ k − |T ∪ V | − 1)!
))
=
1
(n+k)!
·
 n∑
j=0
(
k−1
l−1
)(
n
j
)
(l−1+j)!(n+k−l−j) +
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(l+j)!(n+k−l−j−1)!

=
1
k
+
1
k · (k−1l )
Since the last n players, in (k, k + n], are null players, the central l players are symmetric, and the
Shapley-Shubik index is efficient, the Shapley vector for vk,ln,n+1 is given by SSI(v
k,l
n,n+1) =
(
1
k
+
1
k · (k−1l ) , . . . , 1k + 1k · (k−1l ) , 1k − k − lkl · (k−1l ) , . . . , 1k − k − lkl · (k−1l ) , 0, . . . , 0
)
.
For vk,lm,n the analysis is a bit more complicated. For i ∈ (k, k + n) the i-swings are given by T ∪ V
with V ⊆ (k, k + n]− i and |V | = m− 1, so that the Shapley value for those players is given by
1
(n+ k)!
·
∑
V⊆(k,k+n]−i
|V |=m−1
|T ∪ V |! · (n− |T ∪ V | − 1)!
=
1
(n+ k)!
·
(
n
m− 1
)
(l +m− 1)!(n+ k −m− l)!
For i ∈ [1, k− l] the i-swings are given by U ∪ V and T ∪ V ′, where V ⊆ (k, k+ n], U ⊆ [1, k]− i,
|U | = l − 1, and V ′ ⊆ (k, k + n], |V ′| ≤ m− 1, so that the Shapley value for those players is given
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by
1
(n+ k)!
·
 ∑
U⊆[1,k]−i
|U |=l−1
∑
V⊆(k,k+n]
|U ∪ V |! · (n+ k − |U ∪ V | − 1)!

+
1
(n+ k)!
·
 ∑
V ′⊆(k,k+n]
|V ′|≤m−1
|T ∪ V ′|! · (n+ k − |T ∪ V ′| − 1)!

=
1
(n+ k)!
·
(
n∑
j=0
(
k − 1
l − 1
)(
n
j
)
(l − 1 + j)!(n+ k − l − j)!
+
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(l + j)!(n+ k − l − j − 1)!
)
=
1
k
+ rmk,l,n,
where rmk,l,n :=
1
(k+n)! ·
m−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(l + j)!(n+ k − l − j − 1)! with 0 ≤ rmk,l,n ≤ 1k(k−1l ) .
We have done some numerical experiments with those formulas suggesting the existence of an
Alon-Edelman type result for the Shapley-Shubik index.
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